So when units do not have adequate numbers of officers the army’s foundation gets weakened. Let us see how critical the problem is. The quoted figure of shortage is about 11,000 to 12,000, which approximates to a deficiency of about 30 per cent. Since all the shortages are in the ranks of subalterns and captains, at the unit level this gets compounded to more than 50 per cent of the authorisation. Consequently, units today are making do with barely 8-12 officers against the 18-25 that should be there. Take away leave, sickness and other sundry commitments and the effective strength gets further whittled down to 4-6 officers.

It ought to be a matter of wonder then as to how our army, for instance, successfully fought the Kargil war and continues to effectively combat terrorism and militancy in J&K or in Assam and the Northeast. Some plainspeaking on this score from within is necessary. We must admit that had the army been ‘better’ officered it could have accomplished much more or achieved what it did at lesser cost; better — both in terms of numbers of junior leaders and the overall quality of leaders.

What the army managed to achieve has largely been due to its inherent resilience and the deeply ingrained ethos of duty above all else and delivering without bellyaching, values bequeathed to it in its formative years, post independence, by its leadership — a leadership which was not without its faults.

Symptoms of the growing ailment have been surfacing with increasing frequency over the last decade or so. Suicides, soldiers running amuck, court cases, moral turpitude, the list is long. There would be many explanations for the rash of disciplinary cases that are taking place but we must all accept that the principle reason is leadership.

... contd.