When India and the US surprised the world with a nuclear pact on July 18, 2005, Pakistan and China had little problem seeing its central political significance. By agreeing to change the US domestic law only in favour of India, the Bush Administration was signaling that it no longer treats India and Pakistan on the same nuclear terms.

Two, by agreeing to accept India’s nuclear weapons programme, the U.S. was also highlighting a new political equivalence between New Delhi and Beijing. In response, Pakistan had demanded a similar deal on nuclear cooperation but was rebuffed by the Bush Administration.

China, on its part, put across a simple argument. If the US was willing to modify the nuclear rules in favour of India, others (read Beijing) should be free to help their own friends (read Islamabad).

From being mere talk in 2005, the idea of China selling nuclear reactors to Pakistan has gained ground since President Pervez Musharraf visited China in June this year.

Pakistan’s weapons programmes have already benefited from Chinese nuclear and missile cooperation since the 1970s. China has also supplied a civilian nuclear reactor to Pakistan and is building a second one.

China is currently prohibited from sell]ing additional reactors to Pakistan. But it might hope that the very international debate on making a nuclear exception for India, has opened up the political space for re-establishing nuclear parity between New Delhi and Islamabad.