The Marriott attack was waiting to happen. As a target the hotel stood out: a local franchise for an American chain, frequented by the who’s who of the capital, hosting conferences and upscale wedding ceremonies and housing foreigners. But what made it really vulnerable was inadequate security.

The first attack came on January 26, 2007. A suicide bomber blew himself up and killed a security guard near the parking area of the hotel just hours before the Indian High Commission was hosting a Republic Day function at the venue. The hotel beefed up security after the incident. Barriers were erected just outside the hotel wall, cement blocks placed and cars not allowed in unless they belonged to hotel guests or were dropping someone off. In both cases, they were thoroughly checked before being let in.

Was this enough? No.

The point is that most buildings in Islamabad are vulnerable. None was constructed to cater to the danger of such attacks. While it is important to have local security for buildings that can be high-value targets, none can withstand an attack using high explosives.

The Marriott attack should also make it clear that the capital, as also other major cities of Pakistan, need to have multiple security rings. The question is, how did a vehicle laden with 2000 pounds of explosives get to the Marriott? Clearly, the entry and exit points of the city can be penetrated easily.

That’s as far as pre-emption goes. The other question is the usual: whodunit. Al-Qaeda, Baitullah Mehsud, any of the many groups floating around or a single chain that binds all of them together? As in other cases, speculation abounds and even when evidence will come in, as some will in the course of investigations, it will be more circumstantial than conclusive.

... contd.