Taking all the factors (elaborated on these pages yesterday) into account, the national security advisory board recommended to the government in August 1999 that India should adopt a strategy of ‘no first use’ and a credible minimum deterrence. This was accepted with some modifications by the government in January 2003. There have always been critics of the ‘no first use’ strategy. It is argued that if there is absolutely foolproof intelligence that the adversary is preparing to strike, why should not there be a pre-emptive strike? These critics do not follow up their own scenario further and explain how the pre-emptive strike will avoid a retaliatory strike which the adversary is bound to carry out. While the pre-emptive strike, because of its very nature, will be a counter-force one, the adversary’s retaliation is bound to be a counter-value one compelling the initiator of the attack to follow up the pre-emptive strike with a second strike to inflict commensurate counter-value damage. In a situation where a pre-emptive strike is considered, there may still be a miniscule possibility that the adversary may have a very last minute change of mind; but a pre-emptive strike will compel him to strike back. Therefore, it is not clear what advantage will be gained by resorting to a pre-emptive strike.

It is argued that the adversary’s first strike may be designed to decapitate the command and control of the country and the nuclear force, and in such circumstances the pre-emptive strike would be advantageous. The country should take all necessary precautions to ensure the continuity of command and control under all circumstances. The most effective way of ensuring that the adversary will not succeed in his objective in carrying out such a decapitating strike is to ensure a continuity in respect of succession in both political and military commands. If that is in place, the decapitation strike will lose all its strategic significance. It will evoke a punitive response. The ‘no first use’ strategy is a signal to potential adversaries that the country is in a position to weather a nuclear attack and retaliate punitively.

... contd.