A serious analysis of the BJP’s debacle in UP must begin by noting what went right, or seemed to go right, with the party in this election. Compared to the assembly election of 2002 the party was less disunited. Kalyan Singh had merged his party back into the BJP and he was projected as the future chief minister. The rebellion in Gorakhpur was finally contained. The candidate selection was not worse than last time. By all accounts, the campaign was not run in an inefficient manner. The RSS cadres did work for the BJP this time, more than they have recently.

To top it all, the party had struck a really smart alliance with the Apna Dal, in lieu of the unworkable alliance with Ajit Singh’s RLD. Take the BJP’s 20.1 per cent in the last assembly elections and add to it the 3.4 per cent of Kalyan Singh’s RKP and the 2.2 per cent of the Apna Dal and you get a solid starting point of 25.7 per cent. You begin to understand why the BJP leaders appeared smug in the wake of electoral victories in Punjab and Uttarakhand and after the morale boosting performance of the party in the municipal elections. If the BJP was to rejuvenate itself in Uttar Pradesh, this election was going to be its chance.

Now place the facts of the BJP’s performance against this background. In terms of seats and vote share, this was the worst performance of the BJP since the beginning of the Ramjanmabhoomi movement, the first time it fell below the 20 per cent threshold. Effectively, it was a loss of 3.2 percentage points compared to an indifferent performance in 2002. The losses were not concentrated in some regions or pockets: the party lost substantial votes and seats all over the state — more in West, Bundelkhand and Avadh. In the urban seats too the swing was negative, though much smaller than the rest.

... contd.