Blue water marks

The People’s Liberation Army’s decision to deploy its warships to fight piracy in the Gulf of Aden marks the beginning of a major shift in the Indian Ocean balance of power. On the face of it, Beijing is merely responding to the recent attacks on Chinese commercial shipping and the United Nations Security Council’s authorisation of international action against Somali pirates. The United States, which has a powerful naval presence in the Indian Ocean, has welcomed Beijing’s move and promised to “work closely” with the PLA navy in anti-piracy operations. For India all this is not about international law. After all, as the world’s second largest economy, China has a good case when it claims to act in defence of its growing Indian Ocean maritime trade.

What matters to New Delhi is the inevitable geopolitical impact of China’s rising naval profile in the Indian Ocean. The PLA navy has indeed shown flag in the Indian Ocean for nearly quarter of a century by its “friendly” port calls in the littoral including India. Over the last few years China has taken the lead in building new Indian Ocean ports in Pakistan (Gwadar) and Sri Lanka (Hambantota). Beijing has also reportedly set up monitoring facilities in Myanmar’s Cocos Islands. Beijing’s recent maritime activism, described as the “string of pearls” strategy, is aimed at developing effective naval access in the Indian Ocean. Until now, however, Beijing has not deployed its naval forces in a mission mode in the Indian Ocean. Four years ago when the tsunami hit the Indian Ocean, the PLA navy, unlike its Indian counterpart, was conspicuous by its absence.

As its naval warships set sail for Somali waters this week, Beijing is at once showcasing a blue water navy that it has so assiduously built and signalling a new political will to use military force far beyond its shores. This, in turn, is bound to constrict India’s own freedom of naval action in the Indian Ocean. China’s strategic re-entry into the Indian Ocean after nearly five centuries demands a sophisticated Indian response that simultaneously cooperates with the PLA navy on shared maritime objectives and pre-empts any Chinese moves to establish a permanent base in the Indian Ocean. In a first step, New Delhi must end the current unseemly quarrel between the Foreign Office and the navy on who should lead India’s new maritime diplomacy. As China’s shadow darkens over the Indian Ocean, the government must get its diplomats and sailors to work together as never before.