Actually, some of the harshest criticism of the civil service comes from within the ranks. N.C. Saxena, one time director of the LBSNAA, has this to say about civil servants, “Bright men and women join the civil services, but adverse work environment, constant political interference, meaningless transfers, and corruption below and above them all leads to the death of idealism, and encourages them too to misuse of authority... An important factor which contributes to the surrender of senior officers before political masters is the total lack of any market value and lack of alternative employment potential. Beyond government they have no future, because their talents are so few. Most IAS officers thus end up as dead wood within a few years of joining the service and their genius lies only in manipulation and jockeying for positions within government.”

The analysis in the other reform reports is more or less in line with the above assessment and many of their recommendations are very apt. But invariably they have looked at the problem of the civil service’s failure to deliver from the standpoint of the personal ability of the civil servant — as if the institutional set-up is immaterial.

An underlying implication of such a perspective is that if somehow the competence of the civil servant could be improved, if his mentality could be changed, if corruption could be addressed, then governance in India would be transformed. The wish list of reforms that follows is headed by recommendations concerning fixity of tenure, freedom from political interference and power to transfer being vested only among civil servants. What has not been talked about is the need for IAS officers to deliver on projects, which is what is lacking at present. The institutional lacunae remain.

... contd.