As comparisons between the strong bipartisan support in the US to renew civilian nuclear cooperation with India and China’s opposition on the Indo-US nuclear deal become inevitable in the coming days, Hu can no longer afford to fudge the question. The nuclear issue in Sino-Indian relations has also gained a new salience amidst increasingly credible reports that Hu will announce the sale of new nuclear reactors to Pakistan during his Islamabad next week.

There are some indications that President Hu might broadly acknowledge India’s aspirations for energy security and the importance New Delhi attaches to civilian nuclear cooperation. But that is unlikely to satisfy India, since New Delhi is aware of Beijing’s important caveat that any nuclear cooperation with India must be within the parameters of global non-proliferation regime.

Translated, this condition is a polite way of saying no. However, if Prime Minister Manmohan Singh takes up the issue directly with Hu and the Chinese President recognises the negative consequences of opposing the Indo-US nuclear deal, there could be a very different outcome. If President Hu chooses to be bold, he could recall China’s past civilian nuclear cooperation with India and announce Beijing’s willingness to not just support the Indo-US nuclear deal but also promise to sell Chinese nuclear reactors to India after the international community accepts the deal.

In the early 1990s, in the only instance of civilian nuclear cooperation between India and China, Beijing supplied one consignment of enriched uranium fuel to the Tarapur nuclear reactors. Building on that precedent, Hu has the option of taking that big political leap forward to transform Sino-Indian relations. With no political breakthrough on the boundary dispute, Hu will have very little to show for his visit to India, only the second by a Chinese president in the last six decades.

Hu will recall that the success of Chinese premier Wen Jiabao to New Delhi last year was based on the negotiation of an agreement on the principles to resolve the boundary dispute and the proclaimed Chinese support to India’s candidature for permanent membership of the United Nations Security Council.

Since then the boundary talks have stalled, and China was in the forefront of the campaign to prevent Japan and India from gaining permanent seats at the UNSC. Hu has nothing to lose and everything to gain by adopting a positive approach to India on bilateral nuclear cooperation. China should be fully aware of the extraordinary weight the Indian government and the people have placed on the Indo-U.S. nuclear deal which promises to end three decades of international nuclear discrimination against India.

If China continues to duck the issue, it will not only reinforce all the traditional political prejudices against it in India. In opposing the Indo-US nuclear deal, but reaffirming nuclear cooperation with Pakistan, Hu will be letting down all those in India who have worked for an improvement in bilateral relations.

The Communist parties, which are in the forefront of attacking the Indo-US nuclear deal, will be hard pressed to explain their reluctance to confront the problems arising from Sino-Pak strategic cooperation and their unwillingness to face up to China’s nuclear ambiguity on India.

China, which has carefully monitored the progress on the Indo-US nuclear deal over the last year and a half, will have a big say, twice over, when the deal finally gets debated by the world community in the coming months.

China is a member of the 45-nation Nuclear Suppliers Group, which must approve the attempt by the US, France and Russia to change the international rules on civilian nuclear cooperation with India.

China will also have a say when the India-specific safeguards agreement that New Delhi is currently negotiating with the International Atomic Energy Agency as part of the promise to separate its civilian and military nuclear facilities come up for approval by the Board of Governors. Chinese officials say Beijing is not opposed the Indo-U.S. nuclear pact but have questions of principle that need to be addressed. They insist that Indo-U.S. deal must comply with the international non-proliferation norms. But the essence of the Indo-US nuclear deal is about changing the international non-proliferation norms to accommodate India.

China has also suggested that any modification of the international regime cannot be just in favour of India. It effect it is suggesting that if the US wants to do a favour for India, Beijing would like to oblige Pakistan.

Meanwhile, China seems all set to announce an expansion of civilian nuclear cooperation with Pakistan. From being mere talk in 2005, the idea of China selling nuclear reactors to Pakistan has gained ground since President Pervez Musharraf visited China in June this year.

China is currently prohibited from selling additional reactors to Pakistan. But it might hope that the very international debate on making a nuclear exception for India, has opened up the political space for re-establishing nuclear parity between New Delhi and Islamabad.

One can only hope that President Hu is looking at India and the potential nuclear cooperation with it from a broader strategic perspective. On its part, India should move beyond its own current position of not seeking Chinese support in the NSG as well as in the expansion of its own nuclear power programme.