Second, as we made progress with Musharraf during 2004-07, an unstated assumption in New Delhi was that the army was our best interlocutor. That belief is no longer sustainable.

Once the baton passed from Musharraf to General Ashfaq Kayani, the Pakistan army has consistently looked for a way out of the peace process. Whatever might have been Musharraf’s individual motivations, it is quite clear that the army is not committed to the principles on which Vajpayee and Dr Singh have negotiated with Pakistan since 2004.

If the Pakistan army is indeed the main obstacle to a lasting reconciliation, India has every reason to talk to all the major civilian leaders in Pakistan, including Zardari, who is the president of the republic as well as the leader of its largest political formation.

Promoting Pakistan’s democratic transformation and facilitating civilian supremacy over the army are by no means easy tasks. Nor can they be achieved by India alone. They can be realised only when India works in tandem with the other major powers that have big stakes in Pakistan.

That in turn takes us to the third premise of the peace process, bilateralism. India’s rejection of third party involvement was borne out of the cold war experience when the western powers tilted towards Pakistan.

A lot of water has flown down the Indus since then. The economic and political balance between India and Pakistan has evolved in favour of New Delhi.

A self-confident New Delhi need not make a fetish of bilateralism. It should be exploring, instead, ways to leverage America’s weight and current interest in the Af-Pak region to produce positive change across the border.

... contd.