Yet, and this is important, much will also change.

The continuing movement for the restoration of the judges, the emphasis on the sanctity of the constitution, the stress on national consensus to resolve political and other issues and the new political consciousness is just one aspect of a change already in the offing. Its potential at this stage is not to be seen in terms of its ability or otherwise to effect a change; it can’t. But it’s a competing discourse that has started as a trickle and could become the riverhead of a perennial watercourse.

The second important point is that the seeming instability this movement has brought to Pakistan is akin to breaking eggs to make an omelette. The civil society wants stability but of a dynamic kind — stability that comes through aggregation of interests, the din of politics, not the cacophony of silence.

To this extent and more, most western analysts have got the events in Pakistan wrong. Leaving aside terrorism, never before has Pakistan evinced more resilience and dynamism than it has since March 9, 2007 when a serving general, Pervez Musharraf, tried, unsuccessfully then, to oust the chief justice of Pakistan.

As for the political parties, they have shown that even when the results of the electoral exercise are not entirely indeterminate ex ante, they would rather play the game than opt out. While this is easy to understand in systems where democracy, as “organised uncertainty”, allows political players to determine, rationally, that it is more profitable to stay in the game rather than opting out, the reluctance on the part of major political players in Pakistan to exit the system and subvert it from outside shows they want a non-violent transition.

This is why it is important for the civil society to continue to agitate the issue of the rules of the game while the political players remain wedded to the electoral process, that being the only viable, even if flawed and tainted, mode of political expression.

The two strands are in fact complementary. When the next parliament comes into being, civil society will be addressing and pressuring it, just like it did the previous government.

How the next government will behave towards these demands must be seen in the context of the signals coming from the army. The new army chief has already distanced himself from politics. That is a signal to Musharraf, the former army chief, that the latter may not bank on army support for too long and in all eventualities. This opens up many possibilities in favour of the next parliament.

Let it be said that Musharraf himself is not unaware of the undulated terrain ahead. When he came on national television in the wake of Benazir Bhutto’s assassination and called her “mohtarma” and “shaheed”, he signalled an understanding of new realities, including limits to his own power and its exercise.

The army too knows its limits and limitations. Additionally, it is aware of and very concerned about the terrorist threat. It is spread thin in the NWFP and knows that it cannot tackle the issue without political help. It mayn’t know, as Einstein apparently did, whether it wants the simplicity on this side of complexity or on the other side, but one thing it does know: it doesn’t want to get mired in politics — again.

It will retain its primacy for sure, not so much because it wants to but because that is how the system has gotten configured and that will take time to change. Given the terrorist threat there is, in fact, need for the next government and the army to remain in sync. But the need for that harmony is precisely what allows for a reconfiguration in favour of the civilian partners — provided, they are smart and can take responsibility for the general direction of policy.

The determining factor at this stage, however, would be the future of Musharraf. Pakistanis want him to leave. The next parliament will face pressure on the issue of deposed judges, amendments to the constitution and Musharraf’s own re-election by the previous parliament. The PPP has said it could live with him and doesn’t see any need to impeach him; the PMLN wants him out, as do some other parties and civil society protestors.

While there is no correlation, much less any causal linkage between Musharraf’s departure and the reduction in the terrorist threat or even the resolution of some other political problems, his presence is likely to keep the system unstable. That is the last thing the army wants.

He survived his own coup on November 3 last year because the army had backed him fully. The balance of power is still in favour of the army even as the people want to see Musharraf’s back. But if instability in search of stability persists and if it is seen by the army to impact its own performance in crucial areas of national security, it could be forced into a rethink.

Musharraf’s future will, therefore, depend on whether the army settles for simplicity on this side of complexity or that. It will also determine the post-election course of Pakistan’s politics.

The writer is op-ed editor, ‘Daily Times’, and consulting editor, ‘The Friday Times’, Lahore sapper@dailytimes.com.pk