Opinion China at the UN

The last four decades have seen the end of China’s international isolation,its emergence as the world’s second largest economy,and its rising profile in the United Nations and other multilateral institutions.

In the 1970s and 1980s,China used its return to the UN to feel its way around the world’s foremost multilateral forum,stayed out of controversies as much as possible,and focused on rebuilding its diplomatic and political relations after the damage done by the Cultural Revolution of the 1960s.

As the world shifted and became unipolar after the collapse of the Soviet Union in 1991,Beijing was wary of the new Western agenda for the United Nations that downplayed national sovereignty and emphasised the international “responsibility to protect” and “humanitarian intervention”. But China was reluctant to use its veto power in the UNSC against Western interventions. It exercised the veto only in defence of its own sovereignty. On Western interventions,China chose the prudent path of expressing reservations but avoiding a confrontation.

Over the last decade,China has tended to be a little more proactive,use its veto power to limit the scale and scope of Western initiatives it did not like,and leverage its clout in the UNSC to expand bilateral relations with both the so-called “outlaw regimes” as well as the United States,which needs Beijing’s support in the UNSC.

China’s rare use of the veto earlier this month against a Western resolution condemning Syria has angered the United States and its allies. Analysts,however,say it might be inaccurate to interpret Beijing’s move as heralding a more muscular Chinese approach to security issues in the UN.

Veto on Syria

Beijing justified its veto by citing the principle of non-intervention,the question of regional stability and the pattern of Western misuse of UNSC resolutions. Although the veto was justified in Beijing in terms of these high principles,it was the judgment of the ground situation in the Middle East that guided the recent Chinese actions in the UNSC.

Observers of China’s multilateral diplomacy say it went along with the regional consensus against Gaddafi in the Middle East and did not oppose Western intervention.

The Syrian case involves a more complex power play and the veto is likely to make the West and the regional powers like Saudi Arabia and Iran pay more attention to Chinese interests in the region.

While China’s power has risen in the international system,Beijing is unlikely to accept the Western demands to take more “responsibility” on international affairs. Beijing believes that the costs of collaboration with the West on sensitive international issues might be more than the benefits. For quite some time to come,Beijing would rather avoid taking leadership. China’s emphasis will be on active participation and deeper engagement with all issues,while leveraging its special position in the UNSC and blocking initiatives that threaten its vital interests.

Pragmatism,rather than a grandiose vision,is the driving factor behind China’s strategy in the United Nations and other multilateral forums.

Asian multilateralism

While China remains somewhat cautious on the global front,it has taken a more active role in promoting regional multilateralism. Beijing has taken the lead,along with Russia,in creating the Shanghai Cooperation Organisation in Central Asia. It places a special emphasis on the “ASEAN Plus Three” that brings the ten-nation Southeast Asian forum together with China,Japan and South Korea.

But when it comes to its own territorial sovereignty,China (much like India) is quite clear that it will not submit to multilateral mechanisms. On the question of the contested waters of the South China Sea,Beijing has agreed to negotiate a code of conduct with the ASEAN as a whole.

Beijing,however,insists on resolving the territorial disputes within a bilateral framework with each specific party directly involved rather than collectively with the ASEAN. In the last two years,China has repeatedly reaffirmed its opposition to the “internationalisation” of the South China Sea disputes.

The writer is a senior fellow at the Centre for Policy Research,Delhi