• Two finger jetties, each approximately 950 m long, located on the northern side, with infrastructure for accommodation, power supplies, maintenance, simulators for crew work up etc. These jetties should be able to accommodate two 80,000 ton aircraft carriers or two large amphibious ships, two tankers and some 10 to 14 destroyers or frigates. It may be noted that Hainan island is also a tourist destination and has a large airfield.This same airfield should be able to support the aviation component of the Chinese surface fleet.

• Three finger jetties of approx 300m length on the eastern side, for accommodating six to 12 of China’s new submarines (including the Jin class (Type 094) SSBN, or the Shang class (Type 093) SSN). This dedicated area is protected by a boundary wall which also houses buildings for laboratories to monitor radiation levels of personnel or equipment entering or leaving this restricted area, and also for providing power, water, airconditioning, etc to the submarines in harbour. Outside the perimeter wall can be seen more buildings, which presumably house facilities for maintenance, logistics, accommodation, simulators, workshops for storing conventional torpedoes etc. A large covered building possibly indicates the location of one or two covered dry docks for maintenance of the submarines.

• The internet reports various caverns about 20 m high, and an analysis of one such photograph indicates that these may lead to “covered submarine finger jetties” where the 12m high nuclear tipped, 8000 KM range JL-2 SLBM, can be embarked, without being detected by spy satellites. These caverns are likely to be linked to one or more of the 11 tunnels reported and photographed. These tunnels are likely to lead to underground storages for nuclear and conventional warheads and also for SLBMs. Thus, a JL-2 SLBM, mated with its single 1000 KT or three smaller 150 KT MIRV nuclear warheads could be transported to the cavern for embarking the Jin class SSBN.

• Considering that China is expected to have five each Jin and Shang class by 2010-15, it can be presumed that the tunnels leading to underground storage facilities would store a large number of nuclear and conventional warheads.

Given China’s blue water ambitions, and the rapid build up of its new generation of strategic and tactical nuclear submarines, it was only logical that a new naval base with composite facilities had to come up. Hainan island due to its strategic location was a good choice and surprise cum security were maintained despite it being a popular tourist destination.

India is about 10 years behind China with regard to strategic nuclear powered submarines with a capability to launch intercontinental range ballistic missiles while submerged. There is a similar gap with respect to tactical nuclear powered submarines and shipbuilding and maritime infrastructure in general. If India has to reduce this ‘strategic gap’, and avoid any more unpleasant strategic surprises, some drastic measures will need to be taken, not only to revamp our DRDO, but also our higher defence planning apparatus. Strategic deterrence and ballistic missile submarines cannot be purchased and have to be designed and produced by our scientists and shipyards — the only exception being China’s supply of missile and nuclear weapon technology to Pakistan.

The writer, a vice admiral and former nuclear submariner, retired from the Indian Navy in 2007 as Flag Officer Commanding in Chief, Eastern Naval Command