My concern arises from the nature and content of the international dialogue. America is refusing to be bound by global targets on carbon emissions. They say that such targets would have limited impact if India and China refuse to accept them. This is because both countries are potentially the largest emitters of carbon and there would be no purpose in participating in a protocol that lacks teeth from the outset. India and China have responded in like measure. They have made clear that America’s stand is self-serving and even immoral. It is because of America (and the developed world) that the world is confronting the current problem. It is because of their pattern of growth that carbon dioxide concentrations in the atmosphere have increased from 280 ppm at the time of the industrial revolution to around 400-450 ppm today. Why should the now industrialising world bear the burden of someone else’s extravagance? The polluter must pay and the West should offer a compensatory package of financial and technical support to the rest of the world. India and China have also pointed out that despite their rapid economic growth their per capita emission of carbon is still but a fraction of the emissions from the West.

The Catch 22 conundrum into which this debate has collapsed is not surprising. It reflects the reality that while globalisation has converged national economies it has not dissolved competing nationalisms or parochial politics. The chances of an international consensus on “what must be done” and “who should do what” to arrest global warming are therefore slim.

The question arises: will this debate at the international level dilute domestic efforts to contain carbon emissions? Will the fact that growth (or rather the limitations on growth) is the peg on which India is hanging its objections at the international level sidetrack it from taking appropriate domestic measures to weaken the link between economic growth and atmospheric pollution? Is it conceivable that in the noise of multilateralism India will lose sight of the fact that growth and carbon mitigation are positively correlated; that while growth has no doubt contributed to pollution — emissions in China and India have in absolute terms grown 5 times faster than the US since 1990 and this trend is not decelerating — it is the condition precedent for building the financial resources, the technologies, the infrastructure and indeed the political will to redeem its consequences.

I raise these questions because I find that most debates on climate change in India get bogged down in denunciations of the West rather than in studied introspection of the implications of a scientific reality. The West is of course responsible for the current situation, but the consequence of global warming is global. We cannot escape from these consequences and so irrespective of whether there is an international agreement or not, we have to have a programme of domestic remediation.

India is today at an inflexion point. Growth has pushed past 8 per cent and the prospect of a double digit number is alluringly real. The perennial concerns of inflation, fiscal deficit, poor infrastructure, energy and slipshod governance remain, however, major concerns. They hang over our macro economy like the sword of Damocles. Amongst these the failure to provide reliable, affordable and accessible energy has to be arguably the most worrisome impediment to sustainable high growth.

The government is, of course, fully cognisant of the seriousness of this issue and it has placed energy on top of its economic agenda. The PM chairs an Energy Coordination Committee of concerned ministers; the ministry of external affairs has just announced the setting up of a division on energy security; the Planning Commission is the fount of integrated energy policy and the independent energy ministries (petroleum, coal, power, non conventional and nuclear) have clearly defined sector-specific agendas. The problem is not, therefore, lack of awareness. It is in the tilt towards supply-side issues rather than demand-side management. It is a skew that should be corrected for two reasons: one, there is huge potential value to be unlocked through conservation and energy efficiency. For instance, India is ranked among the most energy inefficient countries in the world. One report suggests that next to China it is the most inefficient. This report states that for every USD 1000 increment in GDP India consumes an additional 1.5 barrels of oil whereas France, Italy and the UK consume only 0.75 barrels for a comparable increment and the US 1.25 barrels. The second reason is that it will reduce appreciably carbon emissions.

This does not mean that the current efforts to develop indigenous hydrocarbon resources and secure international oil/gas through equity or long term purchase agreements should be diluted. Nor does it mean that we should slacken our push to commercialise renewable energy. But what it does mean is that we have to acknowledge that supply-side efforts will not be enough to remove this potential impediment to growth. It means that given the huge scale of our economy and the lead times needed to develop new energy, bio fuels, wind, solar will not materially replace hydrocarbons in our energy mix and that we will remain vulnerable to the vagaries of the hydrocarbons market for the foreseeable future.

What precisely should the government do to capture this value and through which sector can be debated — although I am sure transport and power will offer the greatest opportunity. But what must not be debated is the potential. Demand conservation and energy efficiency is the bridge between economic growth and carbon mitigation. It should consequently be the centrepiece of government policy.

The writer is chairman of the Shell Group of Companies in India. Views expressed are personal