The unrest in Iran,which began as a protest against the rigged election of June 12,2009,caught the Iranian authorities by surprise. These protests have presented serious challenges not only to the political credibility of Mahmoud Ahmadinejad as the future president of Iran,but also to the moral status of Ayatollah Ali Khamenei and his legitimacy as the supreme leader of the Revolution. The protests have been the most serious challenge to Irans clerical regime since the Islamic Revolution in 1979 that saw the downfall of the Shah.
Mir Hossein Moussavi,a moderate challenger to Irans clerical establishment,has frequently appeared to be following the protestors rather than leading them,and it is not clear that he can satisfy them if he opts to try to compromise rather than challenge the present political structure. Today,more than a month after the presidential elections in Iran,no one can be certain about the outcome of this unrest.
But what is more or less certain is that Iran will never be the same again. Whatever happens in the weeks and months that follow,the events of the past 30 days have shaken the Islamic Republic. However,as the days pass,the intensified crackdowns on journalists,intellectuals,students and women activists indicate how determined the Iranian regime is to secure its political future. The country is often described as the biggest jail for journalists in the Middle East and harassment of activists is a routine part of the political scene.
Yet in recent weeks state pressure on protestors of all categories,activists and dissidents has reached new heights. The dominant methods of the regime to quell the unrest are intimidation are censorship,arrests,confessions and,of course,warnings to other nations not to interfere in Irans internal affairs. The same tone was part of the standard rhetoric of all communist dictatorships,and the military dictatorship in Latin America back in 1970s. More than 240 other prominent Iranian lawyers,activists,journalists,professors,human rights defenders,and students who have been arrested without warrants at their homes or places of work by unidentified agents and taken to undisclosed locations.
These detainees,who are mostly charged of endangering national security,are being held in incommunicado detention and the authorities have refused to provide any information regarding charges against them or their condition to their families. Apart from Evin prison,those arrested are often taken to very old prisons which have been out of use. Due to a serious lack of space in the prison,many of the interrogations take place in the cells or corridors and not in an interrogation rooms. Prisoners are beaten and tortured at the time of their interrogation.
The authorities in Iran have been trying very hard to drive protestors from the streets by deploying police and Basij militia in almost every major square in Tehran and other cities. It is true that the popular demonstrations in Iran demonstrated the great bravery of a people as it confronted the Basij militia,but it is also true that the Revolutionary Guard and the security forces have both shown the willingness and capability to violently crack down on peaceful protesters.
The emerging power dynamics leave protestors with tough choices. If they continue informing the Iranian rulers of their lawful rights through nonviolent demonstrations they would certainly increase the influence of the military and security forces and risk bloodshed,but if they put an end to their movement of civil disobedience because of the harsh repression they might lose the support and sympathy of the outside world.
For the Iranian authorities the question is whether a huge crackdown would succeed in putting an end to the popular quest for democracy in Iran or provoke a wider challenge to their rule. For Moussavi and Karubi the choice is whether to accept a humiliating deal that would greatly diminish their moral and political statures. It is also worth underscoring the ambiguous role of Hashemi Rafsanjani.
His recent call at the Friday Prayer at University of Tehran,to restore trust by releasing prisoners,freeing the media,using only legal means,and by dialogue between opposition and the regime,was couched in the language of legitimacy and pragmatism. One should not forget that this election was a tremendous personal affront to Rafsanjani and his family who were publicly maligned by Ahmadinejad during the campaign,who accused them of being not only corrupt but also traitors to the revolution. Also,one of his daughters was harassed,and briefly imprisoned.
On the other hand,Rafsanjani has always been one of the protectors of the revolution and certainly does not want to take action that could hasten the demise of the entire Islamic system. In short,the competing factions of the Iranian nomenclature are hesitating before they make irrevocable choices that could change their political destiny or the future framework of Iranian politics.
Meanwhile,the potential for far broader struggle for democracy is apparent. The recent protests commemorating the tenth anniversary of attacks on the dormitories of Tehran University in 1999 clearly showed that Irans turmoil is not over and many are still serious about their objection to the authoritarian turn they think the country has taken since the disputed election. The fact that so many people came to the streets despite the crackdown indicates the protests that have been created in Iran after the June vote are not going to be easily controlled by the establishment.
However,since Khameneis speech we saw a significant drop in the number of protesters and even more alarming for the anti-regime opposition groups,since Moussavi announced that he will pursue his case through legal means and not on the streets we have seen even a sharper drop in the number of protesters. Assuredly,the diminishing number of protestors could indicate that the protest movement could fade away if opposition leaders lose steam.
All this said,it would be wrong,however,to portray the turbulent internal politics of Iran following the June 12 election as a clash between secular forces and entrenched religious forces. The fundamental debate is over the role of religion in the governance of the state. If the reformers prevail,the constitution would likely be rewritten,and the office of Supreme Leader would be eliminated or greatly reduced in influence. This will be a threat not only to the Supreme Leader,but all those (like Ahmadinejad and the Revolutionary Guards) who depend on his authority.
The writer,former head of the Contemporary Philosophy Department of the Cultural Research Centre in Tehran,has written more than 20 books including Iran: Between Tradition and Modernity and India Revisited: Conversations on Contemporary India