regular newspaper headlines. Moreover, many have criticised the scheme on the grounds that it is simply unconstitutional. Despite this, the scheme has become so institutionalised that it is often viewed as a key indicator of an MP’s performance. In the run up to the recent Lok Sabha polls, many NGOs and media outlets prepared report cards on MP performance using MPLADS expenditures as a key criterion. Now, the government of India is considering nearly tripling the allocation under the scheme, from Rs 2 crore to Rs 5 crore each. As this proposal begins its rounds of South Block, it is worth revisiting some of the reasons for the controversial nature of the scheme and examining why the fund may not be such a good idea in the first place.

The official justification for the MPLADS is that legislators need discretionary funds to respond swiftly to their constituents’ demands. The first report of the parliamentary committee on MPLADS stated that, prior to the scheme, MPs were “silent spectators” who merely recommended works to

local bodies, municipalities or state governments. Drawing on this logic, some state governments launched a similar scheme for MLAs.

Criticism of the scheme is based on two key arguments. One argument is that it assigns executive functions to legislators and thereby confuses the separation of powers. This creates a conflict of interest between the legislator and the executive and seriously compromises legislators’ oversight function. This is the reason the second Administrative Reforms Commission recommended the scheme be abolished.

Another argument, made by the 2002 National Commission to Review the Working of the Constitution, is that it violates the constitutional distribution of powers between the Union, state and local governments (all the activities on which MPs can spend their funds are already on state lists) and is therefore inconsistent with federalism. Furthermore, the 73rd and 74th constitutional amendments mandated that many of these (basic civic services such as roads, bridges and street-lights) become activities to be undertaken by panchayats and municipalities. Thus, the scheme seriously undermines local bodies, which are neither consulted nor involved. Hence the National Advisory Council in 2005 recommended that the guidelines be changed to require that the funds be spent through local bodies.

These criticisms point to two much deeper, unresolved questions confronting our democracy. First, what is the role of the MP, the MLA and the local body representative? Second, what do we, as voters, hold them accountable for?

From the MP’s perspective, the MPLAD scheme is important because it allows him to tangibly and quickly respond to his constituents’ needs. At election time, these achievements can be drawn upon to highlight the MP’s performance. Nevertheless, this presents a dilemma. Since the Constitution already demands that these functions be performed by local governments, not MPs, who should be held accountable by the voter? This dilemma has significantly obfuscated accountabilities and confused voter expectation.

However, the bigger question is: should this be an MP’s role? India decentralised because it recognised that local governments are best suited to assess and address local needs. Local governments were created and entrusted with this responsibility by virtue of their “localness” — an MP typically represents 10-15 lakh voters, while a gram panchayat represents on average 3000 voters — and because they can be held directly accountable for fulfilling these needs. Ironically, they are starved of funds to perform their constitutional roles, while MPs have uninterrupted yearly funds to do the panchayats’ job.

This is not to suggest that the MP is not responsible or accountable for the development of his or her constituency. Rather, it suggests that the MP should do what he or she is best equipped to do. Instead of directly spending money on civic services, an MP ought to be arguing for funds from the Central government to reach local bodies and pushing for appropriate policy decisions. To ensure that services reach their constituents, the MP should monitor the functioning of the local bodies and leave them to do what they are best equipped to do: provide the civic services demanded by their constituents.

Since its return to power, UPA 2 has pledged itself to introducing a new era of accountable government. The first principles of accountability require that rules and responsibilities across all levels of government be clearly defined and that there be no overlap. The MPLAD scheme flaunts this, and thus the government should not increase its scope. Instead, it should empower local bodies with resources and capacities to provide basic civic services to citizens and

encourage MPs to focus on making policy and monitoring the delivery of these services.

The writer is a senior research fellow at the Centre for Policy Research and a member of the Right to Information Assessment and Analysis Group express@expressindia.com