This reflects a genuine confusion, strategic and tactical. Tactically, there was no single command structure for the operations being conducted since Wednesday night; this led to delays, crossed connections and redundancies, the cost of each of which could be measured in lives. The army, the navy and the police were running chains of command parallel to the NSG. Strategically, the security of the harbour, India’s territorial waters and the coastline is divided up between the Customs, woefully under-weaponed; the Coast Guard, always smarting under what it sees as stepmotherly treatment and with designs on being a brown-water force; and the navy. Through the gaps in this structure the terrorists may have sailed to Colaba, making landfall dangerously close to the navy’s sheathed sword, the submarines of Western Command. In 1993, there was an outcry when 800 kg of RDX landed on the Indian coast and destabilised Mumbai. What’s changed since then? And who’s accountable if it hasn’t?