This means no steps can be taken under the national laws of any of the parties to interfere in the nuclear weapons programme and technology of the other party based on technologies and material, nuclear and non-nuclear, equipment and components and information or technology independent of the 123 Agreement.

6. Sixth, Mr Shourie argues that the Prime Minister in allowing American inspectors to roam around our nuclear facilities has failed to fulfil his assurance to Parliament. He, in this context, refers to article 10(4) and 12(3) of the 123 Agreement. Article 10(4) does not refer to American inspectors. It only talks about consultation measures to be agreed upon. Perhaps if the NDA comes to power, they may well choose to allow American inspectors, but that is for the NDA to deal with. Article 12(3) only talks of exchange of experts.

7. The last objection of Mr Shourie is again with reference to Article 8(2) of the Agreement between US and China, which is an Agreement between two nuclear weapon states. Mr Shourie says that India is not being recognized as a nuclear weapon state. This again is factually incorrect. The affirmation in the preamble of the 123 Agreement is: “Affirming that cooperation under this Agreement is between two States possessing advanced nuclear technology, both Parties having the same benefits and advantages, both committed to preventing WMD proliferation.”

Article 2(4), clarifies this position further. The 123 Agreement with India is in fact a unique Agreement which recognizes India’s status as a nuclear weapon state and without signing the NPT allows us access to all aspects of the nuclear fuel supply cycle to fulfil our nuclear fuel energy needs and requirements. It may also be mentioned that the fuel supply cycle assured in this agreement, to which the US has committed, is not found in any other US civil nuclear cooperation Agreement for peaceful use of nuclear energy including with those who are parties to the NPT and China. Further, there is no precedent of an IAEA Safeguards Agreement, which allows a party to take corrective measures in the event there is a disruption in fuel supplies. This has been specifically allowed in the 123 Agreement. This is set out in article 5(6)(c) of the Agreement, which allows India to provide for corrective measures in order to guard against withdrawal of Safeguarded nuclear material to ensure uninterrupted operation of its civil nuclear reactors in the event of a disruption of fuel supplies. This again is a unique provision not incorporated in any other Agreement between US and any other NPT or non-NPT country.

... contd.