Some time ago, just before the European Union enlarged to take in new members from Estonia to Cyprus, two senior EU officials debated an interesting question: with so many governments to consult, how on earth would Javier Solana—the Spaniard who has headed the EU’s foreign-affairs arm since 1999—forge a European consensus on any question of foreign policy?

The more senior of the pair counselled calm. Most countries don’t have foreign policies, he explained cheerfully; Mr Solana’s job was to convince such countries that whatever he was proposing had actually been their policy all along. That would not change with enlargement. The cynical Eurocrat has seemingly been proved right. Today, even with the union enlarged to 27 members, Europe’s foreign policy machinery smoothly churns out common positions all the time. And yet, even ardent pro-Europeans admit that the impact of all this diplomatic activity has, to date, amounted to less than the sum of its parts.

It is not that the EU is inactive. At their most recent meeting on October 27th, EU foreign ministers nodded through an increase in aid for Pakistan, slapped sanctions on Guinea and agreed to lift the last European sanction on Uzbekistan, an arms embargo. The EU flag flutters from warships hunting Somali pirates, and snaps in the Kabuli breeze, notably over an EU police-training base. But the truth is that the EU does not really have foreign policies: it has instruments and tools, such as aid money and co-operation agreements with endless third-country “partners”.

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