Deepwater crew weren’t ready for scale of crisis

Nearly 400 feet long,the Horizon had formidable and redundant defences against even the worst blowout. It was equipped to divert surging oil and gas safely away from the rig. It had devices to quickly seal off a well blowout or to break free from it. It had systems to prevent gas from exploding and sophisticated alarms that would quickly warn the crew at the slightest trace of gas. The crew itself routinely practiced responding to alarms,fires and blowouts,and it was blessed with experienced leaders who clearly cared about safety.

The Deepwater Horizon should have weathered the blowout. Here is why it didn’t:

Every one of the Horizon’s defences failed on April 20. Some were deployed but did not work. Some were activated too late,after they had almost certainly been damaged by fire or explosions. Some were never deployed at all. At critical moments,members of the crew hesitated and did not take the decisive steps needed. Communications fell apart,warning signs were missed and crew members in critical areas failed to coordinate a response.

The result was paralysis. As the drilling crew battled the blowout and gas alarms eventually sounded on the bridge,no warning was given to the rest of the crew. For many,the first hint of crisis came in the form of a blast wave.

The paralysis had two main sources. The first was a failure to train for the worst. The crew members,though expert in responding to the usual well problems,were unprepared for a major blowout followed by explosions. They were also frozen by the sheer complexity of the Horizon’s defences. One emergency system alone was controlled by 30 buttons. The Horizon’s owner,Transocean,provided the crew with a detailed handbook on how to respond to signs of a blowout. Transocean’s handbook was “a safety expert’s dream,” yet one struggles to answer a basic question: “How do you know it’s bad enough to act fast?” DAVID BARSTOW,DAVID ROHDE & STEPHANIE SAUL