It is clear that Musharraf’s action was motivated by his desire to keep himself and his civilian cronies in power and had little to do with saving Pakistan from terrorism or internal chaos. If Musharraf’s position was not threatened by the prospect of an adverse Supreme Court judgment against him holding the dual offices of President and Chief of army staff, he would most likely not have acted.

If there is internal chaos in Pakistan today, it is of Musharraf’s making. After all, it was his arbitrary decision to remove the Supreme Court Chief Justice, Iftikhar Muhammad Chaudhry, in March that initiated the political crisis leading to Musharraf’s latest move.

Ironically, Musharraf has turned to the army and his position as army chief to bail him out of a crisis created by the bad advice of his civilian advisers. Even now, the virtual imposition of martial law appears aimed at protecting the interests of the unelectable Prime Minister Shaukat Aziz and the King’s Party, Pakistan Muslim League (PML-Q).

Chaudhry Shujaat Hussain, president of PML-Q, has been calling for emergency rule since June in the hope of forestalling the loss of power by his faction. Musharraf’s civilian allies are the ones who would have been the biggest losers in any transition to democracy. They are incapable of winning a free and fair election and have resented the prospect of any arrangement that allows Benazir Bhutto to fight, and beat, them at the polls.

For her part, the Pakistan Peoples Party leader pointed out that Musharraf’s decision to purge the Supreme Court while keeping the parliament, provincial legislatures and ministries in their position was rather odd. “The current assemblies’ remaining intact does not mean anything because the legislation they pass is meaningless,” she said. “The constitution under which they were created has itself been suspended.”

But for Musharraf the weakness of his argument hardly matters. His actions reflect the calculation that he can get away with anything as long as the army remains behind him.

Musharraf seems to reckon that the international community would not go beyond ritual condemnation of his actions. The United States would not impose sanctions or suspension of aid because that might impair Pakistani participation in the global war on terror. But Musharraf’s estimation might not be one hundred percent accurate.

The US could reach the conclusion that Musharraf is too distracted with domestic politics to play an effective role in fighting terrorism any longer. The more Musharraf has to repress critics and political opponents at home, the less Pakistan will be able to fight terrorism. After all, when troops have to be deployed to detain Supreme Court judges, lawyers and politicians, there are fewer troops available to fight terrorists.

Pakistan’s intelligence services can either spy on Pakistani civilians dissenting with Musharraf or focus their energies on finding Osama bin Laden and his ever increasing deputies and operatives around Pakistan.

The Bush administration’s hopes that with its help there could be a transition to democracy in Pakistan with a continuing role for Musharraf have been dashed. The US might now start looking beyond Musharraf. Musharraf has risked US support for Pakistan and himself at risk because of his inability to grow beyond being a dictator who must have his way in everything.

Even if the Bush administration acts with restraint, US public opinion and Congress certainly will most likely react very strongly to Musharraf’s power grab. There are many members of Congress who are uneasy about supporting an unpopular military dictator whose record in fighting terror is, at best, mixed. Pakistan is being described by some in the US as “the most dangerous country.”

That characterisation can be contested by Pakistanis only if Pakistan moves along the path of certainty. A sudden suspension of the constitution, and images of mistreatment of judges and lawyers, adds to the doubts already being expressed about Pakistan’s future.

None of Musharraf’s justifications for his second coup sounds believable. For example, terrorism and suicide attacks have been increasing steadily for two years but it is only now that Musharraf claims he needs emergency powers to deal with them.

Musharraf has risked dividing an already polarised nation further. It may be too late for Musharraf to be able to act sufficiently harshly to frighten Pakistan’s civil society and political opposition into submission.

Musharraf’s saviour complex and his belief that he alone can save Pakistan have made an orderly transition to democracy, advocated by the Americans, difficult. It is now clear Musharraf will not change and will certainly not share power.

The defiance of the judiciary and the media might not topple him but it could render Musharraf ineffective to a point where the military rethinks its options. The army will soon recognise that the only thing keeping Musharraf and his civilian cronies in power is the army’s support. The army risks alienating the people of Pakistan further and losing the respect of the people while acting in the interests of Musharraf and his political allies.

At some point the professional soldiers will wonder whether they should risk their institution’s position to keep the ragtag bunch constituting PML-Q in power. That might be the moment when Musharraf’s Corps Commanders might advise their chief to become a civilian like those whose urgings have brought him, and Pakistan, to a difficult pass again.

Husain Haqqani is Director of Boston University’s Center for International Relations, and Co-Chair of the Islam and Democracy Project at Hudson Institute, Washington DC. He is author of the book ‘Pakistan between Mosque and Military’