Having been a witness to the vagaries of militancy in the Valley for the past 17 years, carefully calibrated demilitarisation could well be the beginning of the end of militancy. However, if the situation is mishandled, things may deteriorate sharply, as there are by all estimates approximately 1000 militants still active here — possibly over twice the number across the LoC. The need for caution was made more than evident with the pre-dawn killing of five villagers in Rajouri on March 30. The main aim of deployment of armed forces in insurgent situations is to create conditions for normal economic activity and the politicisation of the militancy. It appears that in Kashmir both conditions have been met to a reasonable degree. Eliminating the roots of dissension is the next big challenge.

The exercise will have to be a politico-military one. Demilitarisation is the flavour of the times in Kashmir. The PDP and the moderate Hurriyat leaders have gained first mover advantage by raising the ante on the issue. The National Conference, not to be left behind, has unsurprisingly jumped in. Fortunately, the political base of these parties is reasonably distinct so they may not raise the pitch to a breaking point. There is also a need to accept that the call for demilitarisation represents not just populist politicking but a need to create greater security in many pockets by undertaking measures to increase the distance between the people and military.

The success of similar ventures in Punjab, Mizoram and partially in Darjeeling provides a large bank of experience. A step-by-step approach is a practical solution which can be adopted. Based on joint security assessment, return of the army to the barracks could be undertaken. The indicators for defining such areas are most significantly the number and type of incidents and commitment of the local administration to guarantee people’s security.

There is no dearth of security expertise either at the level of the state or the Centre to make such an assessment. The proposed three-panel system appears an ideal measure but should be broadbased to include army representatives. This would ensure inclusion of opinion from all spectrums and result in softening of stands leading to greater flexibility. The main fears of the Armed Forces no doubt arise from the prospects of redeployment in areas from where they have been withdrawn. While hard infrastructure may be easy to establish, it is the soft linkages comprising local sympathisers which are difficult to reinvigorate. However, effective assessments will help greatly to address this concern.