Since its invasion and occupation in 2003, Iraq has been a deeply divisive issue in American politics. Obama took full advantage of the unpopularity of the Iraq war to put his rival in the Democratic Party, Senator Hillary Clinton, on the defensive and consolidate his support among the liberal wing of the party. As part of his attempt to now move to the centre of the American political spectrum, Obama has tactically pitted the necessary but failing war in Afghanistan against what he calls President George W. Bush’s “misguided” war of choice in Iraq. By promising an early end to the war in Iraq — withdrawal of most troops by 2010 — Obama keeps faith with his liberal supporters. By sounding tough on Afghanistan and threatening to bomb Pakistan, he at the same time presents himself as a potentially muscular commander-in-chief for flag-waving centrists. This could help reduce the effect of the McCain campaign’s portrayal of the Democrats as being weak on national security. In any case, they have already compelled McCain to assert that he will pay as much attention to the war in Afghanistan as he devotes to that in Iraq.

In his speech on Tuesday, Obama asserted that “the central front in the war on terror is not Iraq, and it never was”. His focus, instead, will be on “taking the fight to al Qaeda in Afghanistan and Pakistan”. “This is a war we have to win,” Obama insisted. Promising to send at least 10,000 more troops to Afghanistan, Obama declared that “the Afghan people must know that our commitment to their future is enduring, because the security of Afghanistan and the United States is shared”.

In emphasising a long-term American commitment to Kabul, Obama also squarely confronted the central truth of the war in Afghanistan. “Make no mistake”, Obama argued, “we can’t succeed in Afghanistan or secure our homeland unless we change our Pakistan policy.” Despite the earlier controversy over his remarks on attacking terrorist bases in Pakistan, Obama reiterated on Tuesday that “we must make it clear that if Pakistan cannot or will not act, we will take out high-level terrorist targets like bin Laden if we have them in our sights.”

McCain, who takes the more traditional American approach to the alliance with Pakistan, was quick to counter Obama’s remarks on Tuesday. “Obama has spoken in public about taking unilateral military action in Pakistan. In trying to sound tough, he has made it harder for the people whose support we most need to provide it.” McCain is not objecting to Obama’s proposal for administering drastic remedies on Pakistan: he is actually against irresponsible public talk about them. Insisting that he will not make “idle threats” and demanding that Pakistan remove sanctuaries for terrorists, McCain thundered, “When I am commander-in-chief, there will be nowhere the terrorists can run, and nowhere they can hide.” After refusing for months to support additional troop deployment in Afghanistan, McCain now promised to dispatch 15,000 additional troops and called for a new programme to support the Pashtun tribes who are ready to fight al Qaeda.

Underlying the two statements, however, is an emerging bipartisan consensus i: irrespective of the outcome of the US elections in November, the next American administration will have no option but to make every effort to counter this threat along and across the Durand Line that separates Pakistan and Afghanistan.

For more than five decades, the American embrace of Pakistan has been the principal obstacle to the improvement of Indo-US relations. At precisely the moment when that relationship seems headed for a huge transformation and Pakistan appears increasingly incapable of controlling its own territory and is seen as a threat to the international system, New Delhi has been caught gazing at its own navel.

If the government wins the confidence vote next week, India will be in a position to look beyond the current surreal nuclear debate and position itself to shape the long-term evolution of Pakistan and Afghanistan. An India that stumbles now would miss a historic opportunity to reconstitute the fundamentals of its security environment.

The writer is a professor at the S. Rajaratnam School of International Studies, Nanyang Technological University, Singapore iscrmohan@ntu.edu.sg