In the final analysis what should be India’s response? Strictly speaking, this is a piece of domestic legislation in the US and does not require any Indian action. Nevertheless what should be our reaction? As mentioned earlier, this bill does not add on any new commitments by India other than those that were voluntarily accepted by India in the July 18, 2005 joint statement and March 2, 2006 separation plan. On the other hand, its length and redundancies would certainly raise some harsh criticism in India.

This is where the reference to moment of truth becomes relevant. Last March, when India announced its separation plan, it was subjected to much criticism in US official and non-official circles alike cutting across all sections of the nonproliferation community as not conforming to the spirit of the July 18, 2005 joint statement. It was left to President Bush, one of his few wise decisions, to cut across the confusion and make the political decision to accept India’s separation plan, since he, quite correctly, recognised that addition or deletion of one or more reactors from India’s civil nuclear list does not really make any substantive difference to the outcome: de facto recognition of India as a nuclear weapon state.

It is now time for India’s political leadership to make the hard choice. Whether to focus on irrelevant details in the joint bill — which do not have any impact on Indian security or indeed require India to undertake any fresh commitments — or accept that this bill is a prerequisite for any change in the international rules governing nuclear commerce in India’s favour, and act accordingly.

... contd.