Welcome as the reforms blessed by the Supreme Court are, they will not achieve this objective given the Indian genius to circumvent any law, unless the root causes for the dependence of political parties on the police to gain power are eliminated. In the Indian milieu characterised by bewildering social diversity, political fragmentation, and parliamentary democracy in which the chief executive is vulnerable to pressures and even blackmail from his legislature supporters if he has to survive in office, this is indeed a formidable task.
In another respect, too, there is need to set the record straight. That is the widespread belief that the Indian Police Act 1861, which is still in force, was designed as an instrument of colonial oppression. The Act is, no doubt, outdated and therefore not comprehensive enough to cater to all the challenges facing the police today. But except for one provision which subjects the district police to the control and direction of the district magistrate, there is nothing in it that smacks of colonial intent. One can safely bet that this provision will not be given up even if a new Act were to come into being.
Let’s examine the Supreme Court’s directions. The creation of state security boards, originally recommended by the National Police Commission headed by Dharam Vira, opens up unchartered territory. One is unsure whether CMs will agree to dilute their control over the police. With the Opposition’s representative on the board, it is doubtful if it can ever develop a unified perception of any police action to maintain law and order.
The prescription on the mode of appointment of the director general of police is based on the premise that free from the threat of premature removal from office, the DGP will be emboldened to direct the police impartially. The CBI was the first organisation to which the Supreme Court applied this remedy for almost identical reasons. But the perception that the CBI continues to serve the partisan interests of the ruling dispensation persists. As long as PMs/CMs can dangle post-retirement allurements to key functionaries, fixed tenures will not be a substitute for the strength of character required to ensure fair play by civil servants. Fixed tenures can in fact lead to abuse, a backdoor device for extending the length of service of chosen officers. Therefore, fixed tenure shouldn’t involve extension of service beyond the retirement age.
Empanelment by the UPSC as a precondition for appointment as head of the police is a wholesome proposition. But it has one pitfall. Annual Confidential Reports on which the UPSC will be dependent don’t adequately capture the ability to take hard decisions. Only an analysis of the nature of assignments held over 25-30 years and a secret poll of fellow IPS officers, other than those in the peer group or those having less than five years’ service, will mark out the deserving. This innovation is worth trying.
Police Establishment Boards are unnecessary if the fixed tenure of the DGP ensures his independence. Even under the 1861 Police Act, the internal administration of the police vests with the DGP, assisted by a hierarchy of officers. In a set-up organised along a chain of command, boards with multiple membership will delay decisions and hamper disciplinary control. Police complaints’ authorities seem a good innovation if they do not become star chambers. Even now some form of separation of investigation from law and order exists in the urban areas and at the state level. But the whole matter requires a thorough review to see how it can be deepened. An important consideration will be to ensure broadly equal and corresponding career prospects to personnel in the two wings.
Independent of any institutional reform, there is a more urgent need to improve the basic working conditions of the police. Grossly inadequate police-population ratios; inhumanly long working hours; poor physical working infrastructure; shoe-string budgets for working expenses; a pay structure which bears no rational relation to the powers and duties entrusted; and a cumbersome criminal justice system — all these factors have cumulatively contributed to the image of the Indian Police as an insensitive, high-handed and corrupt organisation.
The writer is a former governor of Tamil Nadu