The Congress’s decision to defer the implementation of the historic nuclear initiative is true to its recent political tradition. That the Congress President Sonia Gandhi and Prime Minister Manmohan Singh chose to pull back from rejoining the global nuclear mainstream reminds us of former Congress Prime Minister P.V. Narasimha Rao in December 1995 — he came very close to changing the nation’s strategic fortunes but ordering retreat at the very last moment.

Facing enormous international pressure against India’s strategic programmes in the early 1990s, Rao understood the only way to break out of the corner was to conduct a nuclear test. Much of Indian nuclear diplomacy in the difficult days of early 1990s was focused on buying time for that big moment when the scientists were ready to blast off.

By December 1995, the nuclear explosive was ready and had been lowered into the L-shaped hole in the Pokharan desert. As the US intelligence picked up the signals of an impending test, the Clinton Administration formally reminded Rao of the costly political consequences. And for good measure, the Clinton Administration leaked the story to the “New York Times” which published it on December 15.

For three days, the Rao government was like a “headless chicken”, unwilling to either deny or confirm the report. Unable and unwilling to face up to the pressures, Rao called off the nuclear test barely 48 hours before it was to have occurred.

Like Rao, Manmohan Singh did all the hard work necessary for changing India’s nuclear standing in the world and regaining access to global atomic energy markets that had it been shut out for nearly three and a half decades. At the political level, the nuclear deal was about breaking the nuclear parity with Pakistan and regaining strategic equivalence with China.

... contd.