Opinion Dr Singh in DC

India knows that joint declarations do not a relationship make. Recall the brouhaha in India a few months ago over the statement with Pakistan on the margins of the Non-Aligned Summit at Sharm el-Sheikh.

For Delhi the issue is about getting a clear sense from President Obama on where India stands in his conception of Asia. If Delhi wonders why Obama made no reference to India in his Tokyo speech on Asia policy,it is best to put it squarely on the table when the prime minister meets the president.

Earlier this year at the end of May,US Defence Secretary Robert Gates,speaking at the annual Shangri La Dialogue,had underlined India’s critical role as a net contributor of security to the Asia-Pacific.

The prime minister would surely want to know if there is a change; but he also needs to recognise the current political context in Washington.

Those familiar with the United States are aware of the extraordinary complexity of the American policy-making process,which is usually a chaos in the first year of a new administration. Massive personnel changes,the pet fancies of the new policy-makers and the difficulties of coordination do automatically generate conflicting signals to friends and adversaries alike. Obama’s Washington is no exception.

The Indian anxiety about Obama’s foreign policy has been two-fold: on global issues,the US seemed to put all its eggs in the China basket; and in the subcontinent,Obama seemed to drift towards a “Pakistan first” strategy.

These Indian concerns have certainly been magnified by Obama’s first trip to East Asia and his unfinished review of the US policy options in Afghanistan.

India is not the only one that is concerned about Obama’s policy towards East and Southwest Asia. American domestic criticism abounds.

There are many American voices that are upset at Obama’s seemingly excessive deference to China. There are others who criticise Obama for trying too hard to please America’s adversaries while showing little sensitivity to the concerns of US friends and partners.

Some critics suggest that Obama and his advisers have no stomach for traditional great power politics; hence their preference for multilateralism and burden-sharing. Left liberal supporters of Obama demand an early exit from Afghanistan.

There is an extremist view that Obama is preparing to out-source the pursuit of American interests in East Asia to China and in Afghanistan to the Pakistan army.

A few analysts believe that Obama stands for an unsentimental management of America’s inevitable decline on the world stage. The thesis of an “elegant decline” has gathered some intellectual heft after the financial crisis.

Many others dismiss the attempts to impute grand motives to Obama’s policies. They insist the president has been dealt such a weak hand — two difficult wars and a battered economy — that he has no choice but to focus on limiting external commitments and rebuilding America’s strength.

Those who hold that all politics is local say that the president has no settled worldview at this moment; his energies are focused on an ambitious domestic agenda and on making sure his party comfortably wins the congressional elections in 2010.

There is probably a measure of truth in all these assessments; but none of them constitutes the entire reality. Beijing seems to appreciate this more than anyone else and understand that its current relationship with Washington is about mutual vulnerability and not unilateral Chinese advantage.

Beijing is surely pleased that Obama has agreed to accommodate its “core interests”; but it continues to cast a wary eye on the prospects of an American reversal. They wonder why Obama has chosen the Indian prime minister for his first state guest at the White House. The Chinese media has speculated that Obama’s outreach to Burma is part of an attempt to limit Beijing’s influence there.

As he heads into Washington,Dr Singh can bet on four propositions. One,the US is struggling like everyone else in the world to cope with the rise of China,the single most important geopolitical fact of our times. Second,Washington has few good options on Afghanistan.

Third,the Obama administration is weighed down by the challenges of economic and social readjustment at home. Finally,there is no consensus either within the administration or the Democratic Party between the executive and the legislature on the preferred policy orientation towards China,Pakistan and Afghanistan.

Dr Singh’s tasks in Washington,then,present themselves. He must convey unambiguously India’s own stakes in America’s early economic recovery and a readiness to contribute to it in the small ways it can.

On the security situation in the subcontinent’s western flanks,the prime minister must directly address the gap between the Indian and American perceptions on the future of Afghanistan and Pakistan.

Dr Singh must also remind Obama that India has never sought to build its ties with the US in opposition to China nor would ever Delhi accept a subaltern status vis-à-vis Beijing; and that India will pursue good relations with both the US and China on their own respective merits.

The meeting next week between Dr Singh and Obama will not be the last one between the two leaders. Their purpose now must be to generate a level of political comfort that allows a frank acknowledgement of differences,helps minimise them,and launches the two nations on a vigorous pursuit of many shared interests that beckon them.

The writer is Henry A. Kissinger Chair in Foreign Policy and International Relations at the Library of Congress,Washington,DC

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