•You have written that Israel would never be Iran’s primary target in a nuclear or conventional war. Why do you think so?

The Ahmadinejad regime is actually very calculating. Iran assumes (as does the world) that Israel is nuclear capable and would retaliate if hit. A direct confrontation with Israel would bring about its own destruction. Besides, Israel has one of the most advanced missile defence systems in place — almost a 99 per cent chance of destroying Iranian missiles over Arab territory. Then, the United States is unequivocally committed to retaliate on Israel’s behalf.

•Who would the Iranians strike, if they do so at all?

The Arabs. Iran wants to control the oil trade and the gulf. If Saddam could try it once, why wouldn’t the Persians, who have historically never been close friends of the Arabs? And the Arabs don’t trust Iran because this is precisely what they suspect.

•Where is Gaza headed and what have been the repercussions of the Yeshiva attack?

An estimated 80 per cent of Israelis had supported withdrawal from Gaza. Unlike the West Bank, we never had any historical claims on the Gaza Strip. And settlers had no security there. But we wrongly believed that the withdrawal would deprive the Palestinians of a pretext for targeting Israel. Today, Israelis are less forthcoming on concessions and withdrawing from the West Bank to the ’67 borders. The Yeshiva attack certainly hasn’t helped.

•So how enthusiastic are you about the two-state solution and what does the future hold for Jerusalem — an ‘open’ or divided city?

Most Israelis believe that it is in their interest that the Palestinians get their own state. Their living conditions are miserable and life in the camps is inhuman. However, once the Palestinians get their state, how does one ensure that it wouldn’t pursue aggressive designs against Israel? Jerusalem, however, is a more sensitive issue. It is too early to talk yet of Jerusalem as an ‘open city’ or one divided intricately between Arabs and Jews. You have to give Jerusalem time... You are looking at Jews, Muslims and Christians. The most practical thing to do would be to maintain the status quo for a while and see where we are in a decade or two.

•And what about the leadership of Ehud Olmert, somebody who was once regarded by the West as the most pragmatic Israeli leader post-1967?

Olmert is weak, too pre-occupied with his personal survival given the allegations of corruption against him. His coalition is fragile. Olmert, I would say, is not in a position to make any long-term moves. But his predicament is an indicator of the civilian leadership crisis in Israel and the Arab world. We don’t have a Ben-Gurion or a Begin or even a Sharon. The Arabs don’t have a single leader like Nasser or Sadaat anymore. Even Arafat could deliver the goods — unlike the present ones. With Sharon around, we would never have gone to war with Lebanon in 2006.

•Where do you place India on Israel’s diplomatic radar?

India has problems rather similar to Israel. Therefore, the exchange of intelligence and technological know-how could strengthen bilateral relations. And yet, in India, you cannot put security guards in every café, every cinema — this country is too big for that. Drawing the line between nabbing terrorists and victimising innocent people is also a bigger challenge for India.

•Do you therefore advocate any regional alliance?

I think India, Israel, Gulf states, Turkey and Morocco should form a new regional and informal bloc in order to cooperate on practical matters. Such alliances should work according to the one basic principle that an alliance doesn’t mean that we’ve to agree on everything — we must learn to live with our differences. But at all costs, we must prevent people from changing any status quo by force. An alliance of this sort should mutually enhance the positions of the member states — Nehru, Nasser and Tito had understood this well when they formed the Non-Aligned Movement.

•As a historian, what has been your experience in India so far?

My historian friends had warned me about the difficulty in laying hands on documents in the National Archives in Delhi. The Israeli national archives put documents in the public domain after 30 years. India has to change on this count — it should be more forthcoming in disclosing its diplomatic roles. For instance, I am very interested in the exchanges between Nasser and Nehru and in the Indian government’s diplomatic correspondence during the ’67 war. What does a nation have to hide about its past? Let historians look at that past and make their own judgments. That is the only way to learn from our mistakes.