Because Pakistan has become the frontline state in the war on terrorism, several countries have joined the Pakistani debate, of which the most vociferous are the US and UK. These two countries sometimes appear over-eager to influence Pakistan’s policy choices. By contrast, our government appears to regard the Pakistani debate as an internal matter, even though what Pakistan does on terrorism or Kashmir, to take the most telling examples, closely concern us. Is our approach wise, as we think it is, or is it merely fatalism?

That depends on which aspect of the relationship we look at. As far as trade and improved people-to-people contacts are concerned, the new government is extremely positive, in contrast to the Musharraf years. We should be able to get SAFTA back on track, and we might even get the transit route to Afghanistan, which would substantially improve Indian aid delivery to that country.

The problem areas remain Kashmir, the armed groups and terrorism, and we have mixed signals on each. On Kashmir, the various statements by leaders of the new government suggest the following — they will expand Kashmir-centered CBMs and proceed on different tracks of the composite dialogue, without making progress on one track hostage to progress on another, as the Musharraf government did. But they may not accept the frameworks for a resolution that were agreed in the back channel talks.

Despite Benazir Bhutto’s many statements of support for a settlement based on autonomy and a soft border, the PPP never adopted her position as their public Kashmir policy, and it is not clear whether it was even discussed in PPP forums. Clearly that discussion will have to be undertaken rapidly — the peace process of recent years has raised Kashmiri expectations of a settlement in the near future, and those expectations cannot be disappointed. If they are, we run the risk of renewed militancy. In other words, the back channel needs to be renewed as soon as possible, alongside a roadmap to bring the tentatively agreed framework into the public domain.

This brings us to the question of armed groups and terrorism. Last month Hafeez Saeed, the Lashkar-e-Taiba ideologue, proclaimed that with a new government, the Lashkar and Kashmiri jihadis would be back in business. This month the Muttahida Jihad Council called for a review of Pakistan’s Kashmir policy and support for armed groups, many of which are also considering moving the courts to lift the ban on them. Reportedly, the Harkatul Mujahideen has reactivated in Rawalpindi, the Jaish-e-Muhammad in Bahawalpur and Karachi, and the Harkat-e-Jihad Islami in ‘Azad Kashmir’. It appears, too, that Kashmiri mujahideen have congregated in the tribal areas of the NWFP in the past few years, and are now even more closely linked to the pro-Taliban and Al Qaeda affiliated groups.

The new government’s policy towards the NWFP has been to let the provincial government, led by the ANP, devise and lead a conflict reduction strategy comprising talks with militant groups combined with a social development plan for the tribal areas. The talks came close to agreement, with the FATA based Tehrik- e-Taliban Pakistan announcing a cease-fire. Tehrik commander Betullah Mehsud, who is linked to the Taliban’s Al Zarkawi in Iraq and allegedly Al Qaeda, has since halted talks saying the ANP government refuses to withdraw troops from North and South Waziristan, which he says is the quid pro quo.

If the ANP had agreed to withdraw troops, it would have been a repeat of the Musharraf government’s peace deals in tribal areas that allowed militants to regroup. That they have not holds out hopes that they might work towards a more detailed agreement on demilitarisation with the tribal elders, in which troop withdrawals would take place only after there is a verified surrender of arms by militants, as happened in Northern Ireland.

While a peace process in the tribal areas is essential for both Pakistan and Afghanistan, it will not address the Kashmir mujahideen, who have bases and support across the country, and the strongest in Punjab. An unspoken India-Pakistan policy had emerged under Musharraf, to attempt to bring the native Kashmiri mujahideen into the peace process, while cutting off groups such as the Lashkar and Jaish. It got little purchase then, but it could get more purchase now. It is certainly an issue for our government to raise, given that the Pakistani government is in the throes of framing policies to deal with the armed groups.

Of all countries, India has the widest range of forums in which to interact with Pakistanis — from civil society to professional organisations to business to government. How can we not be involved in the Pakistani policy debate?

The writer is a professor at Jamia Millia Islamia and a trustee of the Delhi Policy Group