The problem areas remain Kashmir, the armed groups and terrorism, and we have mixed signals on each. On Kashmir, the various statements by leaders of the new government suggest the following — they will expand Kashmir-centered CBMs and proceed on different tracks of the composite dialogue, without making progress on one track hostage to progress on another, as the Musharraf government did. But they may not accept the frameworks for a resolution that were agreed in the back channel talks.

Despite Benazir Bhutto’s many statements of support for a settlement based on autonomy and a soft border, the PPP never adopted her position as their public Kashmir policy, and it is not clear whether it was even discussed in PPP forums. Clearly that discussion will have to be undertaken rapidly — the peace process of recent years has raised Kashmiri expectations of a settlement in the near future, and those expectations cannot be disappointed. If they are, we run the risk of renewed militancy. In other words, the back channel needs to be renewed as soon as possible, alongside a roadmap to bring the tentatively agreed framework into the public domain.

This brings us to the question of armed groups and terrorism. Last month Hafeez Saeed, the Lashkar-e-Taiba ideologue, proclaimed that with a new government, the Lashkar and Kashmiri jihadis would be back in business. This month the Muttahida Jihad Council called for a review of Pakistan’s Kashmir policy and support for armed groups, many of which are also considering moving the courts to lift the ban on them. Reportedly, the Harkatul Mujahideen has reactivated in Rawalpindi, the Jaish-e-Muhammad in Bahawalpur and Karachi, and the Harkat-e-Jihad Islami in ‘Azad Kashmir’. It appears, too, that Kashmiri mujahideen have congregated in the tribal areas of the NWFP in the past few years, and are now even more closely linked to the pro-Taliban and Al Qaeda affiliated groups.

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