In interviews in his last weeks in office, he has repeated that at the heart of Blairism is ‘liberal interventionism’. That, for most, is longhand for the one issue that currently eclipses all else on his ledger: Iraq. (In his Manchester speech on Sunday, Brown noted that it was the one issue that had most divided the Labour Party and its government.)

In those internationally fractious days of early 2003, Blair held by his eloquence on the need to invade Iraq. And somehow the impression was that, in his conviction in Britain’s ‘special relationship’ with the United States, the feeling that it was the transatlantic alliance that gave his country the capacity to assert its influence, he had been led into the war.

The Blairite narrative differed. By this, his case for intervention in Iraq — that he was doing what he thought was right — had not been manufactured after the Bush administration’s decision. It went back to his friend, Bill Clinton’s administration. In 1999, Blair articulated his “doctrine of international community” in a speech in Chicago. It was part of his effort to persuade Clinton that troops were required on the ground for the NATO effort in Kosovo to be effective.

In that speech he placed the need for ‘internationalism’ in a wider context: “I believe the world has changed in a... fundamental way. Globalisation has transformed our economies and our working practices. But globalisation is not just economic. It is also a political and economic phenomenon. We live in a world where isolationism has ceased to have a reason to exist. By necessity we have to cooperate with each other across nations.”

The most pressing foreign policy problem in the post-Cold War world was to identify the circumstances in which to get involved in other people’s conflicts. Blair identified five considerations for intervention: “First, are we sure of our case? War is an imperfect instrument for righting humanitarian distress; but armed force is sometimes the only means of dealing with dictators. Second, have we exhausted all diplomatic options? We should always give peace every chance, as we have in the case of Kosovo. Third, on the basis of a practical assessment of the situation, are there military operations we can sensibly and prudently undertake? Fourth, are we prepared for the long term? In the past we talked too much of exit strategies. But having made a commitment we cannot simply walk away once the fight is over; better to stay with moderate numbers of troops than return for repeat performances with large numbers. And finally, do we have national interests involved? The mass expulsion of ethnic Albanians from Kosovo demanded the notice of the rest of the world. But it does make a difference that this is taking place in such a combustible part of Europe.”

It was in this speech — with Bush’s move to the White House still more than a year into the future — that Blair made a case against Saddam: “Many of our problems have been caused by two dangerous and ruthless men — Saddam Hussein and Slobodan Milosevic.” And — before confirmation came on September 11, 2001 — he reminded America that as the world’s most powerful country it could not afford to retreat into isolationism.

Now each passing day brings more bad news from Iraq. But Blair’s role in the conduct of the war — in failing to provide a steadying hand and in presenting the case for invasion — came under a cloud very soon after the “coalition of the willing” swept into Mesopotamia. The claims on weapons on mass destruction at Saddam’s disposal to be used within an hour’s notice, defence scientist David Kelly’s death, the Hutton inquiry are, in this story, long familiar milestones.

Also tossed into a mangled heap were arguments for empire that today seem so quaint that it takes effort to remember how seductively they raged just four years ago, and how they swept Blair’s ‘liberal interventionism’ into contestations of America’s imperial burden. Interestingly, the most lively arguments came from intellectuals belonging to Commonwealth countries.

On the liberal end of the spectrum, Canadian human rights scholar Michael Ignatieff wrote in a seminal essay (‘Empire Lite’) in January 2003: “What word but ‘empire’ describes the awesome thing that America is becoming?” This empire was obtained in a state of deep denial but 9/11 showed it contours and the “avenging hatred it arouses”. But: “America’s empire is not like empires of times past, built on colonies, conquest and the white man’s burden. The 21st century imperium is a new invention in the annals of political science, an empire lite, a global hegemony whose grace notes are free markets, human rights and democracy, enforced by the most awesome military power the world has ever known.”

On the more conservative end, also in 2003, Oxford-based historian Niall Ferguson published Empire: How Britain Made the Modern World. In this excessively rosy recap of the good established by the British Empire in the colonies, he sought old solutions to current problems. He applauded Blair’s internationalism, but concluded: “There is, in truth, only one power capable of playing an imperial role in the modern world, and that is the United States.” The obvious lesson the US could take from Britain was that “the most successful economy in the world... can do a very great deal to impose its preferred values on less technologically advanced societies”.

For the US, now in election 2008 mode, increased anti-Americanism and rising human costs of occupation are making more shrill calls to bring the troops back home. Blair, however, is still convinced that the verdict on ‘liberal interventionism’ is not in. Even if the Middle East assignment does not come to pass, the fact that hope fluttered on Palestine upon rumours that he could now work out of a West Bank office must be an optimistic sign for him. He who insisted that history would judge his decision on Iraq is still thought capable of bearing influence in the neighbourhood.