The NSG was raised in the wake of the Golden Temple siege in 1984 and patterned on the line of the British SAS and German SGS. It was mandated, as it still is, to participate in anti-terrorist, assault, anti-hijack and hostage rescue operations and its charter clearly mentions that it is not designed to undertake functions of state police or other paramilitary forces.

The downgrade in NSG’s status began in the eighties itself with it being assigned duties of VIP security. For long, the agency has been trying to shrug off this additional responsibility, but the “Black Cats”, as the NSG commandos have been nick-named, continue to be spotted all over the country performing the duty of hapless bullet catchers.

NSG personnel say there are several other aspects of operational and administrative functioning which has resulted in a steady decline in their status as a crack force.

For instance, while the NSG was initially reporting directly to the Prime Ministers Office, it was subsequently brought under the command of the Home Ministry and thus, began to be treated like any other paramilitary force.

Along with this, came several other concomitant disadvantages. Unlike, say, the RAW, IB and to a large extent, the Special Protection Group (SPG), each purchase of the NSG has to go through routine tendering procedures, with all tender specifications required to be put up on their website. At present, the NSG website has a lengthy list of tender details, asking for bids for repair of their water coolers, toilets and kitchens to the purchase of Stenguns, indoor shooting ranges, metal detectors and heliborne equipment.

The most severe fallout has been the fact that the NSG has failed to keep pace with technological advances and upgrade its armoury either in comparison with commando forces in other countries or with the arms and ammunition now available with terror groups.

Officials reveal that some foreign equipment and weapons provided to them at the time of their inception are still in use, and have already been repaired and refitted several times.

“Every important requirement of the NSG has been bogged down in a bureaucratic paper chase and scrutiny by the Expenditure Department. Other intelligence agencies and the SPG have to go through nothing like this for making purchases,” complained one senior NSG official.

The NSG, for example, has for years been demanding an airborne fleet to be stationed at Manesar (comprising both transport aircraft and helicopters) and the Mumbai operations have only highlighted the legitimacy of this requirement.

But as The Indian Express has reported, the Home Ministry is in the process of purchasing three new aircraft to be used by “all” paramilitary forces for urgent transportation. The NSG, according to the proposal, is among the forces meant to use aircraft from this common pool.

Also, a Cabinet note for the creation of rapid action NSG commando units in different metropolitan towns is ready and the public announcement of this in the wake of the Mumbai attack has taken many in the NSG by surprise. The NSG is basically a deputationist force required to impart round-the-clock combat training to its units and has since long been pressing the Government for additional strength.

In fact, even its sanctioned strength is short of 300 men and officials say the priority for them at this time is to fill the existing vacancies and only then go in for fresh recruitment for the proposed state units.