Opinion Filling the military blanks,a prescription

This state of unpreparedness has come about due to the limitations in funding and the inability to spend even the allotted money in real time,due to the fear of decision-makers being hounded even into their retirement. This is the outcome of a post-Bofors mindset,where every defence acquisition is considered to be a scandal and a hint of speculation of malpractice brings procurement to a standstill.

To improve,it must first be ensured that the entire leadership of the country is entrusted with the responsibility to oversee policies and ensure defence preparedness. This is particularly relevant,as a matter as important as national security warrants broad consensus and sustained bipartisan political support. There is thus an immediate need to create a new supra body,which may be called the “National Defence Council” (NDC),composed of the leaders of all major political parties in Parliament. The chiefs of staff of the three services would make presentations to the NDC on the state of preparedness of the defence forces on an annual/ bi-annual/ or as-required basis. This will be in the presence of the members of the Cabinet Committee on Security (CCS). The government will be obliged to implement and execute the decisions of the NDC. All other existing arrangements will continue as present.

The second important change required pertains to civil-military relations. There is a strong perception in the armed forces that the bureaucracy acts as an intermediary between the military and the political leadership,thereby preventing the military from bringing issues of national importance to their notice. This can be addressed by providing service chiefs complete access to the Raksha Mantri (RM) and vice versa,and to the prime minister through the RM once in six months or as required. In addition,institutionalised integration between the service headquarters and the defence ministry should be achieved through a high percentage of cross posting between civil and service officers.

The third need is to restructure the command and control setup in the three services,as recommended by the late K. Subrahmanyam and the Group of Ministers in 2001,by introducing a chief of defence staff (CDS) and theatre commands system. This arrangement,coupled with a robust and accountable national security apparatus,will further strengthen the edifice of our democracy. Andaman and Nicobar and Strategic Forces Commands are successful models of jointmanship,which need to be replicated. Concomitantly,inter-services appointments should be mandatory for promotion to flag ranks. In addition,theatre commanders should be chosen by selection boards,headed by the CDS and the three service chiefs as members,to ensure that merit is prioritised. This will also add value to the nomination of service chiefs.

The fourth area of improvement relates to procurements. Past experience shows that the present system will not deliver. We need to evolve new rules for defence procurements,which will ensure utmost probity and yet empower decision-makers by introducing a “pre-audit” system. In this,representatives of the CAG and the CVC will be part of the procurement teams for “pre-decision” checks and no post-contract complaints will be entertained. Also,the present procurement organisation should be adequately staffed by specialists and made more cohesive. The streamlining of procedures,including drawing out of attainable qualitative requirements and shortening of trial periods by the services,will also contribute towards speedy acquisitions.

The fifth recommendation relates to the crying need for indigenisation. India has the dubious distinction of being the biggest arms importer in the world. Besides paying exorbitant prices,we also suffer from continued dependence on others,even after inserting a transfer of technology clause in our contracts. The answer lies in target-based indigenisation,say 75 per cent,in next 15-20 years by opening this avenue to the private sector. We must also simultaneously promote arms exports,as this achieves economy of scale in defence production and will considerably reduce the defence expenditure burden.

Last,and most urgent,there is a requirement for quick action within the next couple of years to remove deficiencies in ammunition,including missiles,repairing and preparing unserviceable assets,upgrading critical equipment,and ensuring robust night-fighting capabilities. The raising of a much-delayed strike corps,to attain a dissuasive capability along our northern borders,is part of our strategic imperative.

Finally,let me unequivocally state as a former soldier that the Indian armed forces will not consider any price too high in terms of their sacrifice for national honour. This situation can,however,be appreciably redeemed with a sense of pride and ownership by instituting reforms that are top-down and inclusive. Our country’s leadership has always displayed a great sense of urgency,maturity and sagacity in dealing with national crises; it is our fervent hope and prayer that they will so do now,as before.

The writer is a former chief of army staff