In India on February 5, addressing the Asian Security Conference of the Institute for Defence Studies and Analyses, External Affairs Minister Pranab Mukherjee said: “Personalities such as Henry Kissinger, George Schultz, Sam Nunn and William Perry who were at the centre of crafting nuclear policy and who thought that nuclear weapons were essential to the security of their state are having a rethink today. We welcome this development and hope it leads, as envisaged in the Rajiv Gandhi Action Plan, to a commitment by all states to a nuclear weapon free world.”

While the initiative of Schultz and his associates has not received the support of the present US Administration, India has extended its welcome not only in the above statement of the external affairs minister, but also in a formal statement of its ambassador, Hamid Ali Rao, at the Conference on Disarmament in Geneva on February 28.

India enunciated seven concrete steps towards achieving the goal of a nuclear weapon-free world in the spirit of the Rajiv Gandhi Action Plan, without emphasising a very strict time frame which marked that plan presented to the third UN Special Session on Disarmament 20 years ago. The Indian list of suggestions to the Conference on Disarmament has its own logical consistency and elements of credibility creation rooted in the Indian approach to the nuclear issue over the last two decades.

It is unrealistic to talk of a nuclear weapon-free world unless it is preceded by delegitimisation of the weapon. No weapon deemed legitimate will ever get eliminated. In the case of chemical weapons, the Geneva Protocol of 1925 outlawed their use, and signatories pledged no first use. It took another 68 years for the international community to reach an agreement to eliminate chemical weapons under verification. The four American statesmen talk of the ultimate goal of a world without nuclear weapons and describe it as the top of a very tall mountain and of the need to chart a course to higher ground where the mountain top becomes visible. Logically, that higher ground is delegitimisation of the weapon and an agreement on no first use. Unfortunately, NATO rejected the pleas of Germany and Canada and insisted on the right to first use of nuclear weapons — its legitimacy — in its declaration adopted on the 50th anniversary of the treaty in 1999. The four US statesmen have not dealt with this issue.

The Indian initiative in Geneva on the other hand emphasises this aspect in its seven-step approach to a world without nuclear weapons. These seven steps are: (1) Reaffirmation of unequivocal commitment of all nuclear weapon states to the goal of complete elimination of nuclear weapons. (This is also the objective of the four US statesmen.) (2) Reduction of the salience of nuclear weapons in the security doctrine. (3) Adoption of measures by nuclear weapon states to reduce nuclear danger, including accidental nuclear war, de-alerting of nuclear weapons. (This is also one of the proposals of Schultz and his associates.) (4) An agreement on no first use of weapons by nuclear weapon states. (This crucial delegitimisation measure does not feature in the proposals of the four US statesmen.) (5) A negative security assurance in an international agreement not to use nuclear weapons against non-nuclear weapon states. (This also does not figure in the Schultz-Kissinger-Nunn-Perry initiative, perhaps because such a declaratory assurance already exists. But there are also threats of the use of bunker-buster tactical n-weapons against non-nuclear states.) (6) Convention on complete prohibition of use and threat of use of the weapons. This is an extension of no first use to no use. (7) Convention prohibiting development, production, stockpiling and use of nuclear weapons and on their destruction. (Perhaps this is implied in the vision of a world without nuclear weapons of the four statesmen but is not spelt out as a step.)

India has also suggested to the Conference on Disarmament the appointment of a special coordinator to assist in carrying out consultations on specific measures that have the potential of commanding consensus which can form the basis of a mandate for a possible Ad-hoc Committee on Nuclear Disarmament. It is clear that Indian thinking on moving towards a world without nuclear weapons, going back to Rajiv Gandhi, is broadly parallel to the proposals of the US statesmen except in the crucial respect of delegitimisation as an initial step. The initiative of the four US statesmen is primarily addressed to the American administration.

India has already adopted a no first use strategy that in turn involves according lesser salience to nuclear weapons. In 1985, President Reagan and General Secretary Gorbachev declared that a nuclear war could not be won and should not be initiated. Former US Defence Secretary Robert McNamara in his article in the May/June 2005 issue of Foreign Policy said: “I have never seen a piece of paper that outlined a plan for the United States or NATO to initiate the use of nuclear weapons with any benefit for the US or the NATO and there is no guarantee against unlimited escalation once the first nuclear strike occurs.”

The four statesmen are very influential in the US and the Western world and their programme has been endorsed by the Democratic presidential candidates and their advocacy chimes in many ways with long-held Indian positions. India should now take the initiative to synergise its efforts at the Conference on Disarmament with their campaign and in the process fill the gaps in their approach.

The writer is a senior defence analyst

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