When asked if Advani, as home minister, would have been present, Fernandes replied: “Yes, all were present.” On being told that this meant Advani’s recollection was faulty, Fernandes first tried to alter his earlier answer and suggested that Advani might not have been present “at that point”. But on being pressed further, he said in that case Advani was mistaken and his memory was wrong.

In his book, Singh does not specify what led to the decision. He writes: “It was not easy to decide to go to Kandahar, but somebody had to go. Vivek Katju (joint secretary in the MEA leading the talks with the hijackers), Ajit Duval (IB) and C D Sahay (RAW) were not unanimous in saying, ‘Sir, please depute somebody to come to Kandahar for even though we have agreed to release three when 36 had been wanted, there is no knowing what obstacles, problems may arise at the last minute. We want somebody to be able to then take decisions, on the spot. There will not be time to keep referring matters to Delhi’.”

Singh talks of his “torment” throughout the hijacking in his diary notes of the period published in the book, and his dilemma: “What is the right answer, where does it lie, how to reach it... That is how these terrorists became passengers on the aeroplane... For three terrorists, 161 men, women and children. Is it right? Wrong? A compromise? What? Between two moral rights: saving the lives of the innocents, and a fight against terrorism falls this hollow, unfilled space of the undetermined.”

... contd.