China was operating in a different orbit. It faced no such questions of legitimacy on preserving a nuclear programme. Its challenges lay in its aspirations. China had to cement its place in the global pecking order, which coincides with the nuclear pecking order. In the dock for its “non-transparent, non-democratic system of governance”, China won a major battle when it got its 123 agreement cleared after more than a decade’s wait during Bill Clinton’s second term, but the Bush regime was inclined to reduce inter-dependence on Beijing. It did not take long for China to figure out that its aim to become an alternate superpower lay in the sphere of non-proliferation. And its sustenance would depend on shedding, as quickly as possible, the tag of the “principal polluter” responsible for climate change. Both objectives converged on the nuclear doorstep. By 2005, China had set into motion an ambitious domestic nuclear expansion programme and was giving shape to agreements with countries like Australia to seal up uranium supplies. And, of course, it had to react to talk of the Indo-US nuclear deal, an unhappy, yet uncalculated irritant.

Three years down the line, look where each stands.

Iran played a high-risk game. It stepped up anti-Western rhetoric and made concessions just when it appeared military action was imminent. It dabbled with big powers, judging their constraints well enough to create a series of small opportunities and buy valuable time. Iran’s principal objective was to bring the US to the negotiating table and, as far as possible, on acceptable terms. Crucial to this was to ensure that Washington remains tied down by its commitments in Iraq. Equally crucial was to play up the insecurity in the Gulf over Israel, and here is where its patronage to the Hezbollah came handy. This paid off. Yes, Iran faced sanctions and is definitely not out of the woods yet but is now better placed with the West, working out package after package of incentives to end the crisis.

... contd.