Top officers of the country’s intelligence agencies, including the Research and Analysis Wing (R&AW), have often been at the mercy of the Prime Minister of the day when a new Government comes to power. This was in clear evidence in the post-Emergency era, recalls former Research and Analysis Wing officer B Raman in his book—The Kaoboys of R&AW: Down Memory Lane.

The election campaign in 1977 saw the Opposition parties strongly criticising the role of the Intelligence Bureau, the CBI and R&AW during the Emergency. Their chiefs, who were “accused of letting themselves and their organisations be misused by Indira Gandhi and Sanjay Gandhi for suppressing the opposition and other critics of Indira Gandhi” were all replaced, the book says.

Indira’s return to power in 1980 was followed by a “witch-hunt” of serving and retired officers of departments who are associated with CBI investigations against her and inquiries pertaining to the Emergency.

Another revelation that is likely to raise some eyebrows pertains to Desai’s interactions with General Zia ul-Haq.

Zia, who came to power after overthrowing Zulfikar Ali Bhutto in a 1970 coup, was keen to avoid tension with India till he got rid of Bhutto who had been placed under arrest. He used his “art of flattery” on Desai and kept in touch with him over phone, writes Raman.

“Often he would ring up Morarji Desai on the pretext of consulting him on native medicine and urine therapy. Nothing flattered Morarji more,” the book says.

The charm offensive by Zia soon worked for Pakistan, with Desai telling him— “in a disarmed and unguarded moment one day”—that India was aware of Pakistan’s clandestine efforts to develop a nuclear military capability. “Indiscreet political leaders are the unavoidable occupational hazards of the intelligence procession,” Raman writes.

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