China has taken this attack on its chin, and declared there is no question of walking away from the “Go Abroad” strategy that has encouraged Chinese “multi-national companies” and workers to look for greener pastures abroad, especially in search of oil. Today there are nearly one million Chinese nationals working abroad and about 7000 companies operating in markets around the world.

Ethiopia is not the first place, nor will it be the last, where China’s rising ambitions have run into local resentments. Over the last three years, dozens of Chinese workers, engineers and other civilians have been killed or kidnapped in strife-torn regions of Nigeria, Kenya, Iraq, Afghanistan, Pakistan.

Senior Chinese officials conceded that they were taken by surprise at the turn of events in Ethiopia, but have promised a thorough review of current security procedures abroad and to find ways to reduce the risks associated with venturing abroad.

There are two ways in which China can manage if not eliminate the risks of working in conflict situations abroad. One is to develop closer military and intelligence ties to the host governments, and the other is to increase the presence of its own security forces at sensitive locations abroad.

Until now China has been criticised for its policy of non-interference and doing business with states irrespective of their internal political orientation.

These critics will be crying a lot louder when China really starts taking sides in defence of its growing economic stakes in large conflict-prone countries. There is no rule which says everyone must be on the same side as the West in every conflict.

Lending military assistance to one or the other competing groups is something that all great powers have done when their interests demand it. Beijing will be no exception. While Beijing is facing up to the difficult burdens of being a great power, there is nothing to suggest that New Delhi is considering ways of defending its own growing foreign economic presence.

Cambodian oil

After decades of political and diplomatic investment in Cambodia, India now finds itself out of the race for the exploitation of the nation’s natural resources, including oil. The US Company Chevron announced last week that it has found potentially huge oil fields off the Cambodian coast in the Gulf of Thailand.

As the international energy companies circle around the hydrocarbon booty in Cambodia, China is well placed to get a big share of the new oil. It already controls one of the six major oil fields off Cambodia.

In the last few years, China has become Cambodia’s biggest foreign investor and the largest provider of economic assistance. As part of its initiative to develop the Mekong region, China has undertaken a large number of projects in Cambodia.

India, which defied the US and China in supporting the present rulers of Cambodia through the 1980s, now finds itself an increasingly marginal player. If New Delhi continues to dissipate its long established equities in Laos, Cambodia and Vietnam, the term “Indo-China” that was used to describe this region would soon become a misnomer.

Maldives rivalry

If New Delhi is ceding diplomatic ground in China’s backyard, Beijing is taking the fight into India’s. Last week, Beijing announced that China Eastern Airlines will now fly to Male en route to South Africa.

Its strategic location astride the sea-lanes of the Indian Ocean has made Maldives a major target of opportunity for China in recent years. High level political exchanges have increased in recent years, including a visit by Maldives President Abdul Gayoom to Beijing last September.

While New Delhi pays episodic attention to Maldives, Beijing has dramatically stepped up its economic, diplomatic and political engagement with Maldives.

The writer is professor at the Rajaratnam School of International Studies, Nanyang Technological University, Singapore