It is important that the PM give out the message that New Delhi would like to be treated as a strategic partner on equal footing with Beijing and one that is even prepared to share its candid assessment of the South Asian neighbourhood with the Chinese leadership. Singh should discuss the turmoil in Pakistan and the rise of fundamentalist forces in Bangladesh candidly with Wen in the context of promoting peace and stability in South Asia.

New Delhi, on its part, must not single out Chinese FDI in India on security grounds and convey so to Beijing. Some sectors that are crucial for India’s security interests should be earmarked for Indian companies but the rest be kept open to all.

China too must respond to suspicion in India. This draws upon China’s attitude on issues vital to Indian interests, like UN reform, waiver to the Indo-US nuclear deal at the NSG and continued hardware supply to Pakistan.

Though the UPA government is seen as weak by the Chinese leadership, with some parties inadvertently acting as proxies of Beijing, the PM must be polite yet firm in dealing with his interlocutors next week. There are clear-cut lessons to be drawn on Beijing’s psyche from the April 1987 Sumdorong Chu valley incident that nearly led to an India-China border confrontation in Arunachal Pradesh. In June 1986, Indian security forces noticed that Chinese troops had crossed the McMohan Line into Sumdorong Chu valley in the Thag La ridge area and set up a helipad and border posts. When New Delhi protested, Beijing was aggressive and communicated that it was part of its border management strategy. But it was the decisive leadership of then army chief, General K. Sundarji, that saved the situation for India. Sundarji airlifted an entire brigade of troops to unoccupied positions overlooking the Chinese incursions without asking the government and in support of his ground troops later that year. This move, called Operation Falcon, had the Chinese fuming with Deng Xiaoping openly declaring his intention to teach India a lesson in early 1987. The confrontation never took place and both India and China withdrew to their respective original positions with Beijing silently admiring the Indian audacity. This led to the setting up of a joint working group on LAC clarifications and paved the way for then Prime Minister Rajiv Gandhi’s visit to China the next year.

... contd.