Opinion Homework for Xi

For a leader who has practically no prior foreign policy experience,Xi’s inaugural trip abroad has received high marks,not least because he brought along his glamorous wife,a celebrity folk singer,to charm his hosts — and dazzle Chinese TV viewers who rarely see spouses of their top leaders. But even glowing press reviews would probably not satisfy Xi. Russia and Africa may be important to China as suppliers of natural resources,but only the US can shape and influence China’s future. Xi cannot really establish his diplomatic credentials until he can be seen side by side with the incumbent in the White House. So we can only assume that Xi’s first overseas journey must be a warm-up for his eventual encounter with Obama (they will have at least two opportunities to meet at the G20 summit in St Petersburg,early September,and at the APEC summit in Bali a month later).

For Xi to convince the world and the Chinese public that he can strike deals with the president of the world’s only real superpower,he has plenty of homework and preparation to do. All indications suggest that Xi is eager to stabilise and improve Sino-American relations. That is part of the reason why Beijing rolled out the red carpet for America’s new treasury secretary,Jacob Lew,who was the first Western official to visit Beijing after Xi and his other colleagues formally assumed their positions in the Chinese government in mid-March.

However,the severe damage done to Sino-American relations by China’s counterproductive foreign policy since 2010 requires far more substantive adjustment and reversal on Xi’s part. Topping the list would be the de-escalation of Beijing’s territorial disputes with Tokyo in the East China Sea. In response to Chinese actions,the US has made its position quite clear: it opposes the coercive action China has undertaken to challenge Japan’s administrative authority over disputed islands. Washington has also reiterated that the US-Japan security treaty would cover the defence of these islands,effectively warning China not to escalate further. Under such circumstances,Xi faces a stark choice. After his appointment as China’s party chief,he made a strong foreign policy statement declaring that China “would never compromise on issues of sovereignty and territorial integrity”. His tough rhetoric may have gained him domestic political points,but following through on his pledge would mean confronting not just Japan,but also the US in the East China Sea.

Thankfully,recent Chinese moves indicate Beijing may be looking for a way out. It has stopped sending planes to fly over the islands; official Chinese vessels are also staying out of the territorial waters of the islands. In the meantime,China has submitted its claims to the disputed islands to a UN agency for scientific validation (the UN Commission on the Limits of the Continental Shelf will make a ruling on whether these islands are geographically part of China’s continental shelf,but not determine who owns them).

Such actions are encouraging,but not enough. Xi should further defuse tensions with Japan by temporarily suspending all activities by official Chinese vessels in the waters near the disputed islands and effectively restore the status quo ante. This move will enable Japan to frame a politically feasible response,such as agreeing to negotiate with China,a huge diplomatic concession on Tokyo’s part. Calming the troubled waters in the East China Sea will create an atmosphere more conducive to better ties with the US.

The second step to be taken is harder,but not impossible. Because of the growing political furore in the US over alleged cyber-espionage and attacks attributed to the Chinese military,Xi needs to start a substantive and productive dialogue with the US and seek to establish some basic rules of the game. During Treasury Secretary Lew’s visit,Chinese leaders agreed to open such a dialogue in principle. Xi needs to press his underlings to treat this initiative as a real opportunity to do damage control and avoid future conflict,not as another set of symbolic,endless,and fruitless meetings.

The last step is far more difficult,both for China and the US. Obama’s “pivot” has now become the key driver of Chinese national security calculation. In Beijing,it is viewed as a naked attempt of strategic containment. To allay Chinese fears,an honest and frank discussion involving high-level players from both sides must be held ahead of the meetings between Xi and Obama this fall. It is unlikely that Washington will be able to make the Chinese see the “pivot” completely differently,but a detailed and authoritative explanation of its substance and implications should nevertheless be useful. At least Washington will have shown that it has tried hard. The initial request for a dialogue on such a sensitive topic should come from Xi,since this will demonstrate to Obama that he is more in favour of building trust and much less prone to strategic paranoia.

The political difficulty and diplomatic sensitivities of these necessary steps mean that Xi will need to act immediately. He might like the results of his diplomatic warming-up exercises in Russia and Africa,but the reality is that he can ill afford to invest his precious time in such ancillary activities in the near future.

The writer is a professor of government and non-resident senior fellow at the German Marshall Fund of the US,express@expressindia.com