China, in turn, will seek renewed assurances that New Delhi has no intention to play the Tibet card against it.

Amidst a new diplomatic play on the old themes of Kashmir and Tibet, China`s increasing economic activity in the parts of J&K controlled by Pakistan, and the lack of balance in Beijing’s approach to PoK and Indian Kashmir have become important concerns for the Indian government.

At a time when the UPA government is engaged in sensitive and ‘‘purposeful’’ talks on Kashmir with Pakistan, the role of China, which is in control of different parts of the original state of J&K, has inevitably acquired a new significance.

New Delhi’s attitude to Tibet has also become important amidst the on-going ‘‘unofficial’’ Chinese talks with the representatives of the Dalai Lama, the spiritual leader of the Tibetans who took political refuge in India more than four decades ago.

In recent years, New Delhi and Beijing have traded mutual concessions on the two important territorial issues that have hobbled bilateral relations for so long.

When he visited New Delhi and Islamabad exactly a decade ago, Chinese President Jiang Zemin offered an important advance in Beijing`s position on J&K.

After decades of a political tilt towards Pakistan, including the support for Kashmiri self-determination and the UN resolutions on J&K, Jiang suggested in a speech to the Pak Senate that New Delhi and Islamabad should put aside their dispute and embark on mutually beneficial cooperation.

During the Kargil War between India and Pakistan in the summer of 1999 and the military confrontation during 2001-02, China maintained a measure of political neutrality.

While India took note of the new Chinese approach, it has reasons to worry about Hu’s plans to announce new economic projects in Northern Areas and Pak Occupied Kashmir when he travels to Islamabad later this week.

As it began to publicly revive its position that Northern Areas are part of J&K, India has a natural issue with the modernisation and upgradation of the Sino-Pak transport corridor across a territory that New Delhi claims to be its own.

Equally troublesome is the different political treatment that China gives to Indian Kashmir. Even as its expand their presence in PoK and Northern Areas, China is not willing to acknowledge India’s control over parts of J&K.

Chinese officials avoid visiting Indian Kashmir for fear of offending Pakistan, which claims the entire state as disputed. Beijing has also been dragging its feet on Indian proposals for cooperation across the disputed areas of Ladakh.

Extra-sensitivity to Pakistan`s positions on J&K was apparently part of China`s reluctance to exchange the boundary maps in the Western sector, where the territorial controls of Beijing, New Delhi and Islamabad converge.

Although India might not go public with its concerns, New Delhi would like to see China take a consistent approach towards different parts of J&K.

Meanwhile, China has its own gripe on India’s Tibet policy. Beijing was happy with the “evolution” in India’s position when Prime Minister Atal Bihari Vajpayee`s visited Beijing in June 2003. Since then India has declared that “Tibet Autonomous Region is part of the territory of the People’s Republic of China”. Beijing reciprocated by accepting India’s sovereignty over Sikkim.

In the political documents being prepared for Hu’s visit, India is likely to reaffirm that Tibet and Taiwan are part of China. New Delhi also plans to crackdown on Tibetan protests during Hu’s stay in India.

New Delhi will also reiterate that the Dalai Lama is not involved in any “political” activities on the Indian soil; but Beijing might smirk and point to the Tibetan “government in exile” in Dharamshala.

Given the complex nature of Kashmir and Tibet, New Delhi and Beijing have no option but to finesse their positions. While neither side is expected to get complete satisfaction, both will try and prevent Tibet and Kashmir from becoming obstacles to further improvement in bilateral relations.