Breaking out of the interminable cycle of terrorism appears increasingly difficult for the Indian state. The apathetic response of leaders — mechanically placing the blame for it on Pakistan — demonstrates a lack of strategic will to face the security challenges ahead. These episodes of attacks at regular intervals of two to three months over the past couple of years, seem to follow a cyclic pattern. While the locations may differ, two consecutive attacks in Hyderabad have established a new trend. It indicates depth of penetration.

The roots of India’s failure to prevent recurrence of terrorist attacks lie in an inability to understand terrorism. The question of location is also addressed if one maps the shadow of antagonist terrorist groups such as the Lashkar-e-Toiba and the HUJI. A network of sleeper cells and support organisations provides cover for the operatives. Police inability to trace even a single attacker in the large number of incidents so far indicates the smooth integration of these cells in civil society and the ineptitude of the police operating under a self-imposed constraint of community profiling. While it is easy to castigate the methods used by the US and UK for being somewhat biased, the fact that they have been able to avoid a major attack over the past few years is significant.

Terrorist risk reduction has two primary components: placing likely targets out of reach and neutralising terror cells. The involvement of citizens is as much important for the former as the police. Threat warnings are an important instrument. If the Hyderabad police had indeed received an input of terrorists having penetrated the city, a public warning would have led to higher alertness and perhaps the twin tragedies may never have occurred.

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