Recalling his meeting with top Army officers, including Lt Gen Mehmud Ahmad who was commanding the Rawalpindi Corps, Tufail writes that the Kargil plan was revealed on May 12, two weeks before India retaliated with air strikes, when Ahmad briefed him and others on the operation.

“Come October, we shall walk in to Siachen — to mop up the dead bodies of hundreds of Indians left hungry, out in the cold,” Ahmad is quoted as having said during the briefing, adding that “I have Stingers on every peak” to counter the threat of Indian air strikes against Pakistani intruders.

“The target was a vulnerable section of Drass-Kargil road, whose blocking would virtually cut off the crucial lifeline which carried the bulk of supplies needed for daily consumption as well as annual winter stocking in Leh-Siachen sector. He (Lt Gen Ahmad) was very hopeful that this stratagem could choke off the Indians in the vital sector for up to a month, after which monsoons would prevent vehicular movements and also suspend airlift by IAF,” Tufail writes on details of the briefing.

Expressing surprise over the failure of Indian intelligence to detect Pakistani movements that led to the occupation of Indian Army posts on the heights of Kargil, Tufail says it was well known in Skardu, days before operations were launched, that “something big is imminent”.

“Helicopter flying activity was feverishly high as Army Aviation Mi 17s were busy moving artillery guns and ammunition to the posts that had been vacated by the Indians during the winter season. Troops in battle gear were to be seen all over the city. Interestingly, Army messes were abuzz with war chatter amongst young officers. In retrospect, one wonders how Indian intelligence agencies failed to read any such signs many weeks before the operation unfolded,” Tufail writes.

... contd.