Part of the strange dynamic of the story that I followed is that there has been a tendency on the Indian side to look at Acts that have been passed in our Congress as the adding of new conditions to the deal. I’ve heard more about the Hyde amendment in India than I have ever heard about it in the U.S. I think it’s misunderstood in India. The Hyde Amendment says something so simple and so self-evident: that the implementation of this deal must be in accordance with the U.S. law. It’s kind of a no-brainer, what’s the controversy about that? But if you listen to some of my Indian friends, it constitutes reopening certain issues that have been closed and so on.

• So it’s about a change in the entire proliferation environment in Washington.

Yes, and by the way, the U.S. bears its share of responsibility for the “fraying at the edges” of the non-proliferation regime around the world. You notice I’m saying the non-proliferation regime, and not the three-letter-word, the NPT, which needs to stay in effect. Everybody recognizes that India is not prepared and will not be prepared to join the NPT in its original terms, because among other things, you crossed that bridge a long time ago — 1974 to 1998. But I do think that if the U.S. were to commit itself to a Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty, and if India can see that and say the U.S. did it (and) we will seriously consider it, that would greatly help. If the U.S. pushed hard for an FMCT and India pushed harder for the same, alongside, then all kinds of things would be possible in dealing with whatever situation the government in India faces when the next president comes to the White House.

... contd.