In Congresss coalition of the unwilling,leaders can connect but parties cannot

In a sense,the lack of clarity on how such a crucial issue is playing out between the Congress and its partners in the ruling coalition is not just a momentary political contrivance. It is built into the structure of UPA-2.

UPA-2 is different from all previous coalitions: It has no institutionalised mechanism of interaction or coordination between the coalition-maker and its allies. UPA-2 lacks not just a coordination committee but also a common minimum programme that could serve as a reference point not just for partners or supporters but also for the people on an important ideological or policy issue.

Lacking a formal and continuous forum where smaller parties could come together to talk to the Congress,or confront it,each party must make its peace or war with the senior partner separately and secretly.

In the context of the current controversy,the CPMs Nilotpal Basu points out that by not insisting on either a CMP or a coordination committee in the first place,allies like the Trinamool Congress may have underwritten Congress unilateralism. These allies have forfeited their right to now ask questions of the Congress. A senior Congress minister in UPA-2,who spoke on condition of anonymity,agrees: Each ally must deal with the Congress on the basis of fluctuating personal equations. This is not even multilateralism,but a slip-sliding plurilateralism.

In a larger sense,UPA-2 constitutes the reversal of a trend,even an unlearning,since coalitions began at the Centre in 1996. While that era dawned in 1989,the National Front did not have a formal coordination committee or a common minimum programme. Ever since the first UF government in 1996,however,the repertoire of coordination mechanisms has steadily grown and become more sophisticated.

From learning,there was institutionalisation and then multiplication,sophistication and specialisation followed. Institutional mechanisms were initially valued simply for their role in managing the alliance. Over a period of time,mechanisms have also obtained an identity of their own beyond the instrumental value, writes Kailash KK,political scientist,who has described coalition experiments in India as learning entities. Until now.

The UF governments from 1996 to 1998,supported from outside by the Congress,had a Common Minimum Programme drafted by a sub-committee including among its members,P Chidambaram (then in the TMC),the CPMs Sitaram Yechury and Jaipal Reddy (then Janata Dal). It instituted a Steering Committee,drawing on the experience of coalition governance in Kerala,and a core committee or Standing Committee of the Steering Committee (SCSC). But there was no similar coordination arrangement between the UF and the Congress. Here,the running of the show,and finally its collapse,was dependent on personal equations between the PM and the Congress.

The BJP-led NDA from 1999 to 2004 instituted multiple coordination agencies the National Agenda of Governance (NAG),which was much cited for its relegation of the BJPs core issues; a coordination committee that also extended coordination and negotiation between allies to the state level; and at the governmental level,Groups of Ministers. In the NDA,there was also chatter of a doctrine of coalition dharma and a consensus in favour of a code of conduct for allies.

In 2004,UPA-1 came to power and framed a Common Minimum Programme that was finalised in consultation with the Left parties that supported it from the outside,but not before it ran into its seventh draft. The CMP was adopted by the cabinet,and became the National Common Minimum Programme or NCMP.

UPA-1 had two sets of coordination committees the UPA coordination committee (UPACC) for partners in the ruling coalition,and the UPA government-Left Coordination Committee or the ULCC,linking the government and the Left. Significantly,the ULCC was the first institutionalised coordination mechanism between the governing coalition and the non-ruling partners.

In UPA-1,the Sonia Gandhi-headed National Advisory Council also served as a mechanism of coordination between the government and the Left,and a public reference point for the partnerships parameters.

Now,UPA-2 has jettisoned all these mechanisms and reverted to personality-oriented leader-to-leader interaction between allies.

There are reasons for such a jettisoning,of course. It flows from the nature of the 2009 mandate,or the Congresss reading of it. For all the hype about its victory,the Congress did not make spectacular gains in terms of vote percentage. It did do significantly better in terms of seats,though; its overall gains were shored up by its performance in key states like Andhra Pradesh,UP and Rajasthan.

The Congresss reluctance to institutionalise coordination with its allies could also be seen as the culmination of a decision that preceded the mandate: the Congress had refused to step into the battle fray as part of a coherent coalition. For all purposes,it retained only state-level,not national-level,ties with its allies.

The Congress has always been a reluctant coalition-maker,still unable to completely set aside the fantasy of a return to a long gone era of Congress dominance. Yet,by forming a coalition government,but stripping it of all the necessary institutional arrangements of coordination,it betrays not just its lack of understanding of the changed political moment,but also a tendency towards political and institutional regression.