•You’ve studied the ethnic unrest in Sri Lanka, and written about how India successfully managed its own ‘Tamil problem’ with accommodative ‘state-nation’ policies as opposed to the Sri Lankan state’s aggressive ‘nation-state’ policies. What do you mean by that?

In the 100 years before independence, there was little or no violence between the Sinhalese and the Tamils in Sri Lanka. This conflict was certainly not overdetermined. It started with the “Sinhala only” tone of the general election campaign of 1956. The bill to make Sinhala the “one official language” of Ceylon was introduced on June 14 1956 and passed nine days later. Tamil speakers could take the higher civil service entrance exam in English, but further tests for promotion could only be conducted in Sinhalese. Suddenly, in one area after another of the state apparatus, there were no Tamils in senior positions anymore. I have spoken to Sri Lankan prime ministers from different parties and all have told me that the decision on language set in motion the present destructive dynamic.

Now look at Tamil Nadu. Our 50,000-persons survey of the five countries of South Asia in 2005-6 tells us that the people of the state rank way above the Indian average in terms of pride in their Indian identity, as well as satisfaction with democracy and trust in government. And yet, they also rank way above the Indian average in pride in their Tamil identity. The data is amazing. It affirms that human beings are capable of multiple and complementary identities.

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