Reports from the Conference on Disarmament in Geneva inform us that a fourth coordinator has been named to deal with the discussions on the draft nuclear fissile materials cut off treaty which had been stalled for well over a decade. Some well-informed observers in the country have raised the issue of the US policy of pressing for the treaty without any verification provision. At present, it is too early to say whether the US draft tabled last year will make any progress in the conference. There are very strong objections to a fissile materials cut off which is not subject to verification. The North Korean nuclear test, the Security Council sanctions on Iran for its failure to comply with the demand to cease its uranium enrichment, the nuclear Walmart run by Dr A.Q. Khan for well over 16 years (and still continuing, according to US observers), the proliferation from one of the major weapon powers to a non-weapon state in the eighties and nineties, Iraq running a parallel nuclear programme outside the IAEA inspection regime and the rationale for the institution of the proliferation security initiative by the US and its allies highlight the need for an effective verification regime.The fissile materials cut off treaty will cover only the production of fissile materials for weapon purposes and not plutonium and enriched uranium for non-weapon purposes such as energy generation, submarine propulsion etc. The US and western countries suspect that Iran, which says it is carrying out uranium enrichment for peaceful purposes, can easily extend it to produce weapon-grade material. There have been more attempts at weapon proliferation with enriched uranium than plutonium. In these circumstances, it will not be surprising if there is a vigorous and prolonged discussion on the verification issue.In India, the issue of our strategic arsenal being capped short of our assessed requirements for a credible minimum deterrent on the basis of a FMCT coming into force has been one of the core issues in the debate on the Indo-US nuclear deal and our dealings with the nuclear suppliers group. It is therefore necessary to focus on an Indian strategy in case FMCT comes into force in the next few years. India can take the stand as it did on the nonproliferation treaty that it will stay out of the treaty and accept all the consequences, as it did in the case of NPT. Secondly, the Indian strategic community can conclude that with FMCT added to other nuclear arms control measures, there is likely to be a stable international situation and the Indian stockpile as it will be by the time the FMCT comes into force will be adequate to meet the needs of a credible minimum deterrent. Western think tanks have estimated that by early 2000, India should have had enough fissile materials of weapon grade for about 100 weapons. This is on the assumption that our reactors and reprocessing plants had worked to optimum capacity. In addition, India has tested the reactor grade plutonium and proved that it is weapon usable. What should be the size of a credible minimum deterrent is a matter for a multidisciplinary decision in which there have to be inputs such as assessment on the likely future international security milieu, strategic doctrines of our potential adversaries, their stockpiles, our diplomacy in the emerging balance of power, our own capabilities in terms of dispersal, camouflage, reaction time etc. Such an interdisciplinary decision calls for expertise in international relations, foreign policy and military nuclear strategy.If after such an exercise, it is concluded that in the post-FMCT era, which by definition could be considered a more stable and internationally peaceful era, our stockpile would be inadequate to meet our needs of a credible minimum deterrent, then a strategy has to be formulated to accelerate the buildup of our arsenal before the FMCT comes into force. That can be done if all our reactors are switched to weapon grade plutonium production and our reprocessing capacity is expanded to match it. If the NDA government had worries about the size of our credible minimum deterrent being limited by FMCT to an unacceptable extent, as they now warn about such a risk in the light of our proposed dealings with the US and NSG, they should have done it from 1998 onwards. That would no doubt have been at the cost of some shortfall in power generation and a more rapid depletion of uranium. There is the view that for national security such costs are bearable. Further our strategists and scientists can conclude that a mix of weapons from pure weapons grade plutonium and reactor grade plutonium can provide the necessary credible minimum deterrent. There has been a lot of rhetoric in some quarters about the risks to our national security if India were to conclude the 123 Agreement and deal with NSG. But there has been very little discussion on alternative strategies that are possible to meet the risks. Now the news on FMCT from Geneva should generate serious debate on the issue of how much is enough, what should be our credible minimum deterrent and how we set about reaching it. The government’s decision will have to be based on the factual position provided by our scientific community on our uranium availability, feasibility of running all reactors for weapon grade plutonium production, our reprocessing capability and our ability to have usable weapons from reactor grade plutonium, intelligence assessment on future international security milieu and threat assessments to be provided by the intelligence community and the MEA, capabilities of our adversaries and tactical and strategic issues involved in the military deployment of the nuclear arsenal. There is a nuclear command authority. This issue has to be considered by them urgently. In other countries they would commission the best available brains to have an interdisciplinary task force deliberation and then consider it in the nuclear command authority.The writer is a senior defence analyst
