If after such an exercise, it is concluded that in the post-FMCT era, which by definition could be considered a more stable and internationally peaceful era, our stockpile would be inadequate to meet our needs of a credible minimum deterrent, then a strategy has to be formulated to accelerate the buildup of our arsenal before the FMCT comes into force. That can be done if all our reactors are switched to weapon grade plutonium production and our reprocessing capacity is expanded to match it. If the NDA government had worries about the size of our credible minimum deterrent being limited by FMCT to an unacceptable extent, as they now warn about such a risk in the light of our proposed dealings with the US and NSG, they should have done it from 1998 onwards. That would no doubt have been at the cost of some shortfall in power generation and a more rapid depletion of uranium. There is the view that for national security such costs are bearable. Further our strategists and scientists can conclude that a mix of weapons from pure weapons grade plutonium and reactor grade plutonium can provide the necessary credible minimum deterrent.

There has been a lot of rhetoric in some quarters about the risks to our national security if India were to conclude the 123 Agreement and deal with NSG. But there has been very little discussion on alternative strategies that are possible to meet the risks. Now the news on FMCT from Geneva should generate serious debate on the issue of how much is enough, what should be our credible minimum deterrent and how we set about reaching it. The government’s decision will have to be based on the factual position provided by our scientific community on our uranium availability, feasibility of running all reactors for weapon grade plutonium production, our reprocessing capability and our ability to have usable weapons from reactor grade plutonium, intelligence assessment on future international security milieu and threat assessments to be provided by the intelligence community and the MEA, capabilities of our adversaries and tactical and strategic issues involved in the military deployment of the nuclear arsenal.

... contd.