5

Fallback safeguards: Would the US inspectors roam around the Indian nuclear facilities, in the event of an unlikely end to the IAEA safeguards arrangements?

No. The 123 Agreement offers no role for any party other than the IAEA in the verification of India’s commitments for peaceful use of imported technology. From the launch of its nuclear programme many decades ago, India always accepted safeguards on imported nuclear equipment and material.

Under the 123 Agreement, India is committed to IAEA safeguards “in perpetuity” in return for “assured fuel supplies”. In the unlikely event of a breakdown of this arrangement with the IAEA, Article 10.4 offers consultations to arrive at “appropriate verification measures”. Apprehensions about a special US role in safeguarding India’s civilian nuclear programme seem entirely misplaced.

6

Full Civil Cooperation: Is India entitled to all nuclear cooperation it needs from the United States?

Yes. Article 2.2 defines the scope of the 123 Agreement as including a range of areas from nuclear research to safety to “full civil nuclear cooperation activities covering nuclear reactors and aspects of the associated nuclear fuel cycle including technology transfer on an industrial or commercial scale”.

Some critics have cited the Hyde Act to say “full” cooperation does not include transfers of uranium enrichment, reprocessing and heavy water production technologies. It is indeed the policy of the United States not to export these technologies to any nation, even its closest allies or even other nuclear weapon states.

The practical question for India, however, is, should it demand technologies just because they are not on offer? If India is an exporter of heavy water and has been reprocessing for four decades why would it want to get these technologies from the United States, that too under very intrusive conditions? Why would the Indian government want to demoralise the scientific community by importing these sensitive technologies?

... contd.