However, under the terms of either the 123 agreement or any one of the current alternatives under consideration by the NSG members, the US or members of NSG respectively would cease to transfer any items or technology controlled by the NSG Trigger List, if India were to conduct another test. Such a broad condition on continuation of supplies would simply be unacceptable to India.

• Why is this condition unacceptable to India?

India unilaterally declared a moratorium on further testing in 1998 after its nuclear tests. There is no reason to believe that conditions since then have changed to warrant any testing by India now. None of the other nuclear weapon states existing at that time, that is 1998, have conducted any tests since then. The one nuclear test conducted since then by another country, North Korea, was not considered to be of such a national security threat to India that India felt it had to review its moratorium policy. However, a test by one or more of the other six recognised nuclear weapon states may pose a threat to India’s national security.

Under such a circumstance — a breach of announced moratorium on nuclear testing by one or more of these six nuclear weapon states — may require India also to reconsider its own moratorium on nuclear testing. India cannot, therefore, afford to give an unconditional “under no circumstances” moratorium on nuclear testing.

However, neither can India take refuge behind the façade of national security to keep its nuclear testing options open without any condition. It would have been advisable, if at the time of its announcement of its moratorium, India had set forth the terms under which it would continue with the moratorium. Regrettably, it did not do so then. This error was compounded when Prime Minister Manmohan Singh too repeated the moratorium without any conditions. It is time India defined the contours of its moratorium policy more narrowly than it has done so far.

... contd.