If the July 18 joint statement reflected political will to move in a certain direction, the March 2 Separation Plan was a major step, domestically, for India gained US recognition of its weapons programme. The Hyde Act, however, spotlighted India’s flexibility to accept US domestic compulsions and showed the immense power the non-proliferation lobby still wields in Washington.

On the 123 agreement, strangely, the onus was on India to get it right, — the stakes were larger for New Delhi and so would be the implications.

It was clear from the start that the US, which had a fixed template of the 123 agreement, was looking to leave the contentious issues open-ended to allow the balance of power to play itself out at a later date. India, on the other hand, was aware that the Hyde Act gave a one-time waiver and that this agreement would have to stand the test of time. It was keen that no question remained uncovered by the agreement. This tussle over detail saw many hiccups, at points even hardening positions on either side, thereby threatening the N-deal.

The most exasperating moment for India was the June visit of the American pointsman for the N-deal, Under Secretary of State Nicholas Burns. Washington had clearly hoped to seal the agreement then, offering to consider India’s requirement to reprocess spent fuel at a later date when the need so arises. The US was willing to discuss a separate agreement for reprocessing in the future.

... contd.